The Klan, the Congress, and the Court: Congressional Enforcement of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments & the State Action Syllogism, a Brief Historical Overview by Curtis, Michael Kent
  
1381 
THE KLAN, THE CONGRESS, AND THE COURT:  
CONGRESSIONAL ENFORCEMENT OF THE FOURTEENTH AND 
FIFTEENTH AMENDMENTS & THE STATE ACTION SYLLOGISM, 
A BRIEF HISTORICAL OVERVIEW 
Michael Kent Curtis* 
INTRODUCTION 
Early congressional attempts to enforce the Fourteenth and Fif-
teenth Amendments were frustrated far too often by the U.S. Su-
preme Court.1  Supreme Court opinions then and since have ignored 
too much historical context.2  The missing context includes the his-
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 1 E.g., United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 554 (1875) (“The fourteenth amendment 
prohibits a State from depriving any person of life, liberty, or property, without due proc-
ess of law; but this adds nothing to the rights of one citizen as against another.”); United 
States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 217 (1875) (“The Fifteenth Amendment does not confer the 
right of suffrage upon any one.  It prevents the States, or the United States, however, 
from giving preference, in this particular, to one citizen of the United States over another 
on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.”); cf. United States v. Harris, 
106 U.S. 629, 644 (1882) (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment did not support a 
federal statute punishing individuals in a lynch mob for depriving the victim (a prisoner 
in a state jail) of equal protection of the law); The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 
Wall.) 36, 83 (1872) (holding that an act of the state legislature granting a corporation 
the exclusive right to maintain slaughterhouses, among other provisions, did not deprive 
plaintiffs of due process, equal protection or privileges and immunities and eviscerating 
the Privileges or Immunities Clause). 
 2 See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 620–21 (2000) (discussing early Supreme 
Court cases interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 
507, 520–24 (1997) (discussing the historical background of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment).  This article continues and develops earlier work on this subject.  See generally 
MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, FREE SPEECH, “THE PEOPLE’S DARLING PRIVILEGE”:  STRUGGLES FOR 
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN AMERICAN HISTORY (2000) [hereinafter CURTIS, FREE SPEECH] 
(giving a history of free speech between the colonial era and the Civil War); MICHAEL 
KENT CURTIS, NO STATE SHALL ABRIDGE:  THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF 
RIGHTS (1986) [hereinafter CURTIS, NO STATE SHALL ABRIDGE]; WILLIAM W. FREEHLING, 2 
THE ROAD TO DISUNION:  SECESSIONISTS TRIUMPHANT 1854–1861 (2007); LEONARD L. 
RICHARDS, “GENTLEMEN OF PROPERTY AND STANDING”:  ANTI-ABOLITION MOBS IN 
JACKSONIAN AMERICA (1970); WILLIAM SHERMAN SAVAGE, THE CONTROVERSY OVER THE 
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torical background of the Fourteenth Amendment and the terrorism 
that provoked efforts to enforce the Fourteenth and the Fifteenth 
Amendments.  By leaving out context, the Court has obscured what 
was at stake. 
A broader context includes slavery and civil liberties, the suppres-
sion of free speech and effective democracy in the South before and 
after the Civil War, and the appeal to democratic values and to na-
tional Bill of Rights liberties before and after the Civil War.  A broad-
er Reconstruction context includes the attack by political terrorists 
on majority rule, speech, press and political association, and the right 
to vote. 
Simply reading Supreme Court opinions (then and later), one 
would not understand that political terror during Reconstruction was 
a key weapon used to undermine biracial democracy in the South.  
One would certainly not understand the extent to which the United 
States Supreme Court facilitated the result.3  Though race was a cru-
cial factor, any account of the attack on Reconstruction is grossly mis-
leading to the extent that it emphasizes race to the exclusion of ma-
jority rule, democracy, and political freedom.  These values were at 
 
DISTRIBUTION OF ABOLITION LITERATURE, 1830–1860 (photo. reprint 1968) (1938); Mi-
chael Kent Curtis, The Fourteenth Amendment:  Recalling What the Court Forgot, 56 DRAKE L. 
REV. 911, 941–55 (2008) (discussing, as a contribution to the Drake Symposium on For-
gotten Constitutional Provisions, how various government officials and judges thought 
the Fourteenth Amendment should be applied); Michael Kent Curtis, John A. Bingham 
and the Story of American Liberty:  The Lost Cause Meets the “Lost Clause,” 36 AKRON L. REV. 
617 (2003) [hereinafter Curtis, Bingham] (discussing, as a contribution to the symposium 
on John A. Bingham, different interpretations of the Fourteenth Amendment around the 
time of the Civil War); Clement Eaton, The Freedom of Thought Struggle in the Old South, cited 
in RUSSELL BLAINE NYE, FETTERED FREEDOM:  CIVIL LIBERTIES AND THE SLAVERY 
CONTROVERSY, 1830–1860 (1972).  For additional scholarship on application of the Bill of 
Rights to the States, see AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS:  CREATION AND 
RECONSTRUCTION (1998); Richard L. Aynes, On Misreading John Bingham and the Fourteenth 
Amendment, 103 YALE L.J. 57 (1993); George C. Thomas III, The Riddle of the Fourteenth 
Amendment:  A Response to Professor Wildenthal, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 1627 (2007) (arguing for a 
negative to agnostic view of application); Bryan H. Wildenthal, Nationalizing the Bill of 
Rights:  Revisting the Original Understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1866–67, 68 OHIO 
ST. L.J. 1509 (2007) (citing sources on both sides of the debate but supporting applica-
tion).  For an outstanding article dealing with the attack on democracy during Recon-
struction, see Gabriel J. Chin & Randy Wagner, The Tyranny of the Minority:  Jim Crow and 
the Counter-Majoritarian Difficulty, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 65 (2008) (focusing on the 
victory of “Redemption” and disfranchisement ending Reconstruction as replacing major-
ity with minority rule). 
 3 The opinions themselves of course do not mention such facilitation.  See, e.g., Harris, 106 
U.S. 629; Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542; Reese, 92 U.S. 214; The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36.  
For an account of the facts surrounding Cruikshank, see CHARLES LANE, THE DAY FREEDOM 
DIED:  THE COLFAX MASSACRE, THE SUPREME COURT, AND THE BETRAYAL OF 
RECONSTRUCTION (2008) [hereinafter LANE]. 
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stake both for Americans of African descent and for their white allies.  
By undermining protections for both white and black Republicans in 
the South, the Court wounded democratic values and severely 
wounded protection for fundamental rights of all American citizens.  
The Court’s decisions helped a minority that used terrorist tactics, 
force, and fraud displace democracy and majority rule.4  The results 
were especially awful for Americans of African descent.5 
I.  BACKGROUND 
As the title of this conference recognizes, the Thirteenth, Four-
teenth, and Fifteenth Amendments were a second founding.  In the 
second founding, a second group of framers sought to give the na-
tion a new birth of freedom and to bring it closer to the ideals of the 
Declaration of Independence and the Constitution’s preamble.  The 
nation sorely needed a second founding. The slave system had sys-
tematically undermined liberty and equality.  Slavery had done this 
not only for slaves and free blacks, but for whites as well.6 
Under the original Constitution, states and individuals could and 
did deny slaves virtually all liberties, and if the hapless slave escaped 
to a free state, the Constitution (as interpreted in Prigg v. Pennsyl-
vania7) broadly protected the right of the slave owner to get him 
back.  In Dred Scott,8 the Supreme Court had held that free Americans 
of African descent could never be citizens of the United States.  Only 
 
 4 See, e.g., ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION:  AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863–1877, 
at 279, 342–44, 425–44 (1988) (describing the violent tactics that some whites used to in-
timidate blacks and Republicans); VERNON LANE WHARTON, THE NEGRO IN MISSISSIPPI 
1865–1890, at 181–206 (1984) (explaining the use of political violence and fraud, fol-
lowed by disfranchisement, in the South in 1875); LANE, supra note 3.  See also cases cited 
in supra note 3. 
 5 For some of the consequences, see, for example, DOUGLAS A. BLACKMON, SLAVERY BY 
ANOTHER NAME:  THE RE-ENSLAVEMENT OF BLACK AMERICANS FROM THE CIVIL WAR TO 
WORLD WAR II (2008) (describing abuse of the criminal justice system and other abuses 
in Southern states that reduced Americans of African descent to virtual slavery); Chin & 
Wagner, supra note 2, at 110–22 (setting out consequences from the racial caste system to 
disfranchisement and criminal justice). 
 6 See, e.g., CURTIS, FREE SPEECH, supra note 2, at 216–70 (describing the killing of Elijah Lo-
vejoy, who was defending his anti-slavery press from a mob, and the suppression of anti-
slavery speech in the North by mob action and in the South by laws and mobs); id. at 271–
99 (detailing the suppression of Republican meetings, supporters, and campaign litera-
ture, etc. in the South); Curtis, Bingham, supra note 2, at 640–41 (noting the same denial 
of free speech in the South). 
 7 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 613–14 (1842) (“[W]e have not the slightest hesitation in holding, 
that, under and in virtue of the Constitution, the owner of a slave is clothed with entire 
authority, in every state in the Union, to seize and recapture his slave . . . .”). 
 8 Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). 
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United States citizens were entitled to the rights, privileges, and im-
munities set out in the Constitution; Americans descended from 
slaves were excluded.  By the Dred Scott decision, free blacks had no 
federal constitutional rights. 
Earlier, in Prigg v. Pennsylvania,9 the Court struck down a Pennsyl-
vania law that guaranteed a due process hearing to Americans of Af-
rican descent captured in Pennsylvania as supposed “slaves.”  Penn-
sylvania had freed all slaves in the state around 1800, and it passed a 
series of laws that sought to protect its black citizens from re-
enslavement.  The centerpiece of that protection was a law requiring 
a due process hearing before blacks found in the state were taken 
from the state and consigned to slavery for life.10 
In Pennsylvania, all persons were presumed to be free.  In slave 
states, blacks were presumed to be slaves.11  The Prigg decision upheld 
the right of the supposed slave owner to capture her supposed slave 
in Pennsylvania and return the slave and her children to slavery with-
out any legal process whatsoever. 
A due process hearing before removal was crucial.  Once a black 
person was removed from Pennsylvania to a slave state, she would be 
stripped of the presumption of freedom and be presumed to be a 
slave.  However, the Supreme Court held the slave owner had an im-
mediate right to possession of the slave and any delay at all, such as 
that required for a hearing, would interfere with the slave owner’s 
constitutional right to immediate possession.12 
The pre-Civil War federal system allowed states to deprive free 
Americans of African descent of all sorts of rights, including the right 
to contract, to inherit, to own real property, to testify against whites, 
to preach, to bear arms, to assemble, and to enjoy freedom of 
speech.13 
 
 9 Prigg, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539. 
 10 See id. at 602 (setting out Pennsylvania statute).  For an early complaint to Congress from 
Pennsylvania about the kidnapping of free blacks, see 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 229–30 
(1800); CURTIS, FREE SPEECH, supra note 2, at 108–09. 
 11 See Prigg, 41 U.S. at 576 (noting Hambly’s brief for Pennsylvania on the conflicting pre-
sumptions). 
 12 See id. at 612 (“Now, certainly . . . it may fairly and reasonably be said, that any state law or 
state regulation, which interrupts, limits, delays, or postpones the right of the owner to 
the immediate possession of the slave, and the immediate command of his service and la-
bour, operates, pro tanto, a discharge of the slave therefrom.”). 
 13 See, e.g., Aldridge v. Commonwealth, 2 Va. Cas. 447 (Va. Gen. Ct. 1824) (stating that slaves 
and free blacks are not generally protected by the Virginia Bill of Rights:  “[t]he numer-
ous restrictions imposed on [free blacks and mulattoes] in our Statute Book, many of 
which are inconsistent with the letter and spirit of the Constitution, both of this State and 
of the United States, as respects the free whites, demonstrate, that, here, those instru-
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Slavery not only undermined liberty for Americans of African de-
scent, but also undermined liberty for whites.  In the South, state laws 
banned expression that would tend to make free blacks or slaves “dis-
content.”14  The ban applied to virtually all anti-slavery expression ad-
dressed to white voters.  It was enforced by searches and seizures for 
anti-slavery books and pamphlets and cruel punishments.15  So, as 
both Lincoln and Douglas recognized in their famous debates, Re-
publicans could not campaign in the South or organize a Republican 
party there.16  Mob violence against Republicans was common and ef-
fective. 
By the late 1850s, most Republicans in the House of Representa-
tives had endorsed a project to abridge (as a campaign document) 
Hinton Helper’s anti-slavery book The Impending Crisis of the South.  
The book highlighted the negative effect of the slave system on non-
slave owning whites and advocated state by state elimination of slavery 
by democratic action.17 
In North Carolina, an elderly minister circulated Helper’s book as 
a Republican campaign document.  He was convicted and sentenced 
to prison under the state’s bad tendency statute.  In 1860, the state 
legislature changed the statute against incendiary documents to pro-
vide the death penalty for the first offense.18 
Mobs made frequent resort to such laws unnecessary.  For exam-
ple, when a chemistry professor at the University of North Carolina 
was outed by a Raleigh paper as a supporter of Republican John C. 
Fremont in the 1854 presidential election, he was fired from his job 
at the University, and a mob drove him from the state.19  Southern 
 
ments have not been considered to extend equally to both classes of our population.”)  
The Black Codes, passed after the Civil War, which abridged for Americans of African de-
scent the rights of speech, assembly, religion, to bear arms, and to be free from cruel 
punishments, would have been constitutional but for the Thirteenth and Fourteenth 
Amendments.  See infra text accompanying note 30 (setting out these restrictions on free 
Americans of African descent). 
 14 See, e.g., Act to Prevent Circulation of Seditious Publications, N.C. Rev. Code ch. 34, sec. 
16 (1854) (revising 1830 N.C. Sess. Laws ch. 5, at 10–11). 
 15 See CURTIS, FREE SPEECH, supra note 2, at 260–63 (discussing Southern suppression of an-
ti-slavery documents); id. at 290 (describing how the North Carolina Council of State 
warned postmasters to ban incendiary books or newspapers and to strictly scrutinize out 
of state merchants, tract distributors and book dealers). 
 16 CREATED EQUAL?:  THE COMPLETE LINCOLN-DOUGLAS DEBATES OF 1858, at 290–91 (Paul 
M. Angle ed., 1958); CURTIS, FREE SPEECH, supra note 2, at 282. 
 17 HINTON ROWAN HELPER, THE IMPENDING CRISIS OF THE SOUTH:  HOW TO MEET IT (1857). 
 18 See CURTIS, FREE SPEECH, supra note 2, at 271–72, (describing Helper’s book); id. at 271–
96 (discussing Worth’s case and the change in the statute). 
 19 CURTIS, FREE SPEECH, supra note 2, at 290. 
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mobs punished those who attended Republican national conventions 
and dispersed a Republican meeting in Virginia.20 
Nor had these outrages been limited to the South.  Mobs in the 
North attacked abolitionists21:  in 1838 a mob burned a hall abolition-
ists built in Philadelphia devoted to free discussion,22 and mobs de-
stroyed anti-slavery newspaper presses.23  In the most dramatic case, a 
member of the mob killed Elijah Lovejoy, a minister and editor in Il-
linois, who was defending one of his printing presses from a mob.  
Mobs had destroyed the previous three.24  The city government of Al-
ton, Illinois had refused Lovejoy’s request for protection from the 
mob.  Responding to the killing of Elijah Lovejoy defending his press 
from an anti-abolition mob, critics frequently insisted that the mob 
had denied Lovejoy the national constitutional privilege of freedom 
of the press.25 
With the end of the Civil War, the nation abolished slavery with 
the reluctant assent of the former Confederate states.  For most Re-
publicans this converted former slaves into American citizens, and for 
many leading Republicans, American citizens were entitled to fun-
damental rights that included those in the Bill of Rights, as well as to 
equality of rights under state law.26  But, as the 39th Congress con-
vened in 1865–1866, Republicans saw not a new birth of freedom, but 
a rebirth of slavery, including private violence of the sort aimed at 
opponents of slavery before the Civil War.27 
After the Thirteenth Amendment was ratified, Southern states 
and localities passed Black Codes.  These Codes discriminated against 
 
 20 CONG. GLOBE, 36th Cong., 1st Sess. 1860–61 (1860). 
 21 See CURTIS, FREE SPEECH, supra note 2, at 129 (describing a mob attack on William Lloyd 
Garrison). 
 22 See id. at 248–50 (depicting Pennsylvania Hall as a place for free discussion and its de-
struction by a mob). 
 23 See id. at 140–41 (describing an 1835 attack on an abolitionist meeting and newspaper in 
New York state); id. at 149 (depicting the destruction of James G. Birney’s press in Ohio). 
 24 Id. at 216. 
 25 See id. at 230–31 (discussing free speech and press in connection with the Lovejoy killing). 
 26 See, e.g., CURTIS, NO STATE SHALL ABRIDGE, supra note 2, at 48–54 (noting the Thirteenth 
Amendment as making blacks citizens and discussing the rights of citizens), 60–61 (Con-
gressman Bingham); cf. id. at 62 (Congressman Donnelly), 74–76 (Congressman Wilson 
in the Civil Rights bill debate), 79–80 (Congressman Thayer), 139–40 (Judge Davis).  But 
cf. id. 78–79 (Rep. Shellabarger, Civil Rights Bill merely secures equality except to the ex-
tent that citizenship is involved in it). 
 27 E.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 783 (1866) (statement of Rep. Ward); id. at 911 
(Rep. Cullom rejecting “the ancient order of things, when liberty of speech was abridged, 
and the bludgeon used to silence the voice eloquently pleading for the oppressed of the 
land”); id. at 1013 (Rep. Plants noting the pre-War suppression of speech:  “no man could 
utter the simplest truths but at the risk of his life”); id. at 586 (Rep. Donnelly referring to 
“the old reign of terror” in the South). 
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the newly freed slaves and returned them to a state of semi-slavery.  
For example, a local code in Louisiana prohibited a “negro” from 
passing within the limits of the parish without written permission 
from his employer; prohibited absence from the employer’s premises 
after 10 p.m. without written permission; prohibited “negroes” from 
renting or keeping a house within the parish; required them to be in 
“regular service of some white person,” and banned them from bar-
tering or exchanging merchandise without written permission of 
their employers.28  Provisions such as these have been widely noted, 
even in decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court.29 
But the Codes often went beyond racial discrimination.  They also 
abridged, for Americans of African descent, fundamental rights in 
the Bill of Rights—if one assumes, as leading Republicans often did, 
that these rights limited state and local governments.  For example, 
local codes banned “public meetings or congregations of ne-
groes . . . after sunset”; and special permission of the captain of the 
(former slave) patrol was required for any meeting.  “No negro shall 
be permitted to preach, exhort, or otherwise declaim to congrega-
tions of colored people, without a special permission from the presi-
dent of the police jury . . . . No negro who is not in the military ser-
vice shall be allowed to carry fire-arms, or any kind of weapons, within 
the parish, without the special written permission of his employ-
ers . . . indorsed by the nearest . . . chief of patrol.”30  These provisions 
violated the right to assemble, to freedom of speech, to bear arms (as 
it was then widely understood), and to free exercise of religion—
assuming again (as many leading Republicans did) that these provi-
sions established personal, nationwide rights of American citizens 
that all states should respect. 
Republicans in Congress who framed the Fourteenth Amendment 
in 1866 saw another equally troubling aspect of the rebirth of slavery.  
They saw a rebirth of “private” violence in the South aimed at sup-
pressing political opinion.  “Freedom of speech,” lamented one con-
 
 28 See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 516–17 (1866) (setting forth an ordinance of 
Opelousas, Louisiana); WALTER L. FLEMING, 1 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF 
RECONSTRUCTION:  POLITICAL, MILITARY, SOCIAL, RELIGIOUS, EDUCATIONAL, & 
INDUSTRIAL, 1865 TO THE PRESENT TIME 279–81 (1906) (setting forth an ordinance of St. 
Landry Parish, Louisiana). 
 29 See The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 70 (1873) (describing Black Codes, 
but omitting provisions that would violate the Bill of Rights if binding on state and local 
governments). 
 30 See FLEMING, supra note 28, at 279–81 (setting forth an ordinance of St. Landry Parish, 
Louisiana); see also CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 516–17 (1866) (setting forth an 
ordinance of Opelousas, Louisiana). 
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gressman, “as of old, is a mockery.”31  Others made similar observa-
tions. 
II.  ENFORCING THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT:  THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT 
OF 1866 
In response to the Black Codes, Republicans in Congress passed 
the Civil Rights Act of 1866.  The Act provided that all persons born 
in the United States were citizens of the United States and of the state 
in which they resided. 
[S]uch citizens, of every race and color . . . shall have the same right, in 
every State and Territory in the United States, to make and enforce con-
tracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, 
sell, hold, and convey real and personal property, and to full and equal 
benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and property, as is en-
joyed by white citizens . . . .32 
Democrats immediately attacked the Civil Rights Act as unconsti-
tutional.  Republican supporters cited the Thirteenth Amendment 
and its Enforcement Clause.  As many Republicans saw it, by abolish-
ing slavery, the Amendment had conferred liberty on the slave.  
Slaves were now citizens, entitled to all the rights of American citi-
zens.33  The Black Codes were attempting to deprive the newly freed 
slaves of liberty.  By this view, the Thirteenth Amendment not only 
ended slavery in name, it also empowered Congress to stamp out the 
badges and incidents of slavery.  Because the Black Codes imposed 
badges and incidents of slavery on the newly freed slaves, Congress 
could nullify them.  Republicans faced a counter-argument:  North-
ern states that did not have slavery had sometimes imposed these dis-
abilities on free Americans of African descent.34 
Leading Republicans cited other constitutional justifications as 
well.  James Wilson, Chairman of the Judiciary Committee in the 
House, said the Act was supported by the power of Congress to en-
force the guarantees of liberty and property in the Fifth Amend-
ment.35  Finally, some leading Republicans cited the interstate Privi-
leges and Immunities Clause—reading it expansively to protect both 
 
 31 CONG. GLOBE, 39TH Cong., 1st Sess. 783 (1866) (statement of Rep. Ward). 
 32 The Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 STAT. 27 (emphasis added). 
 33 See generally CURTIS, NO STATE SHALL ABRIDGE, supra note 2, at 71–83 (detailing the de-
bate on the Civil Rights Act).  
 34 Id. 
 35 Id. at 79–80 (Rep. Wilson and Rep. Thayer). 
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fundamental national rights including those in the Bill of Rights and 
equality to state-created rights.36 
III.  THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment (minus the Citizenship 
Clause which was added in the Senate) was drafted by Congressman 
John A. Bingham, a centrist anti-slavery congressman from Ohio.  
The Amendment made all persons born or naturalized in the United 
States citizens of the United States and of the state in which they re-
sided.  The Amendment continued:  “[n]o State shall make or en-
force any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citi-
zens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of 
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any 
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”37 
The Bill of Rights question discussed below is central to congres-
sional power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment.  The rights 
Congress can enforce under Section 5 of the Amendment depend in 
part of what guarantees of liberty the Amendment contains. 
An earlier version of the Bingham amendment was in a different 
form.  It provided, “[t]he Congress shall have power to make all laws 
which shall be necessary and proper to secure to the citizens of each 
state all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states; and 
to all persons in the several states equal protection in the rights of 
life, liberty, and property.”38  Bingham, like a number of his col-
leagues, had read the Article IV Privileges and Immunities Clause as 
containing an ellipsis.  As he read the Clause, it provided that “[t]he 
Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immuni-
ties of Citizens [of the United States] in the several States.”39  For him 
and others, the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United 
States were all rights shared by all citizens of the United States; these 
included, but were not limited to, the rights in the Bill of Rights.40 
Bingham explained that his first version of the Fourteenth 
Amendment gave Congress the power to enforce the Bill of Rights.  
Enforcement was required because “this immortal bill of rights em-
 
 36 See id. at 73–78 (Rep. Lawrence and Sen. Trumbull).  
 37 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
 38 CURTIS, NO STATE SHALL ABRIDGE, supra note 2, at 57. 
 39 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2. 
 40 CURTIS, NO STATE SHALL ABRIDGE, supra note 2, at 62 (describing Bingham’s ellipsis read-
ing and his discussion of the constitutionality of Oregon’s proposed constitution). 
1390 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 11.5 
 
bodied in the Constitution, rested for its execution and enforcement 
hitherto on the fidelity of the States.”41 
The early version of Bingham’s amendment received substantial 
support from Republicans, but it also encountered significant opposi-
tion.  One leading critic, Congressman Hale, a New York Republican, 
focused on the equal protection provision.  Hale thought states were 
already required to obey the Bill of Rights.  However, he believed that 
the equal protection provision would allow the federal government to 
legislate on virtually all subjects previously reserved to the states—
such as, for example, the rights of married women.  This he found 
too great an incursion of principles of federalism.42 
Bingham defended his original proposal as needed to enforce the 
guarantees of the Bill of Rights.  He explained that in Barron v. Balti-
more the Supreme Court had held that the guarantees of the Bill of 
Rights did not limit the states.  That showed the necessity of his 
amendment.43  In another speech Bingham doubted that Congress 
had the constitutional power to pass the Civil Rights Bill.  He agreed 
with those like James Wilson that the guarantees of the Bill of Rights 
should be enforced and that the Civil Rights Bill was an effort to en-
force the Bill of Rights; but, unlike Wilson who supported the Civil 
Rights Bill partly on that ground, Bingham insisted a constitutional 
amendment was necessary to make that possible.44 
Congressman Giles Hotchkiss made a particularly influential 
speech criticizing Bingham’s first version.  He raised two objections 
to Bingham’s early version.  Like Congressman Hale, his federalism 
concerns focused on the equal protection language, which he under-
stood to allow Congress to pass uniform and preempting laws 
throughout the United States on the protection of life, liberty, and 
property.45  Hotchkiss had no objection to the privileges or immuni-
ties section; it was, he said, like the existing Constitution.  But Hotch-
kiss understood the amendment to allow Congress to “establish uni-
form laws throughout the United States upon the subject named, the 
protection of life, liberty, and property.  I am unwilling that Congress 
shall have any such power.”46 
Hotchkiss also had a second objection.  The laws passed under the 
proposed amendment could simply be wiped out by the next Con-
 
 41 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1034 (1866) (statement of Rep. Bingham). 
 42 Id. at 1063–65 (statement of Rep. Hale). 
 43 Id. at 1089 (statement of Rep. Bingham). 
 44 Id. at 1291 (statement of Rep. Bingham); id. at 1294 (statement of Rep. Wilson). 
 45 Id. at 1095 (statement of Rep. Hotchkiss). 
 46 Id. 
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gress.  “Now, I desire that the very privileges for which the gentleman 
is contending shall be secured to the citizens; but I want them secured 
by a constitutional amendment that legislation cannot override.  
Then if the gentleman wishes to go further, and provide by laws of 
Congress for the enforcement of these rights, I will go with him.”47  
Apparently returning to his focus on the equal protection provision, 
Hotchkiss suggested, “[w]hy not provide by an amendment to the 
Constitution that no State shall discriminate against any class of its 
citizens; and let that amendment stand as part of the organic law of 
the land, subject only to be defeated by another constitutional 
amendment.”48  Bingham’s first version was postponed and replaced 
by the current version of Section 1. 
When the (nearly) final version reached the Senate floor, Senator 
Howard spoke on behalf of the Joint Committee in favor.  He ex-
plained that he considered the Privileges or Immunities Clause very 
important.49 
Howard said the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United 
States would include those in the Article IV Privileges and Immunities 
Clause50 plus 
the personal rights guarantied and secured by the first eight amendments 
to the Constitution; such as the freedom of speech and of the press; the 
right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the Government 
for a redress of grievances . . . ; the right to keep and bear arms; the right 
to be exempted from the quartering of soldiers in a house without the 
consent of the owner; the right to be exempt from unreasonable searches 
and seizures . . . ; the right of an accused person to be informed of the 
nature of the accusation against him, and his right to be tried by an im-
partial jury of the vicinage; and also the right . . . against cruel and un-
usual punishments.51 
Howard continued: 
[T]here is no power given in the Constitution to enforce and to carry out 
any of these guarantees.  They are not powers granted by the Constitu-
tion to Congress, and of course do not come within the sweeping [neces-
sary and proper] clause of the Constitution . . . , they stand simply as a 
bill of rights in the Constitution, without power on the part of Congress 
to give them full effect; while at the same time the States are not re-
strained from violating the principles embraced in them except by their 
own local constitutions . . . .  The great object of the first section of this 
 
 47 Id. (emphasis added). 
 48 Id. 
 49 Id. at 2765 (statement of Sen. Howard). 
 50 Id. 
 51 Id. 
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amendment is, therefore, to restrain the power of the States and compel 
them at all times to respect these great fundamental guarantees.52 
Senator Howard, like House Judiciary Chairman Wilson,53 described 
rights in the Bill of Rights as fundamental rights (and as privileges).  
He said that the lack of power to enforce was corrected by Section 5.  
It provided “a direct affirmative delegation of power to Congress to 
carry out all the principles of all these guarantees.”54 
In discussing the need for the amendment, Howard alluded to the 
Barron decision without naming it.  He noted that the “restriction 
contained in the Constitution against the taking of private property 
for public use without just compensation is not a restriction upon 
State legislation, but applies only to the legislation of Congress.”55 
In his speech on the amendment, Bingham explained that it 
would allow the Congress “to protect by national law all the privileges 
and immunities of all citizens of the Republic and the inborn rights 
of every person within its jurisdiction whenever the same shall be ab-
ridged or denied by the unconstitutional acts of any State.”56  As an 
example of the need for the provision, he cited past instances of state 
injustice and oppression such as imposition of cruel and unusual pu-
nishments.57 
Much of the discussion of Section 1 was cryptic.  Congressman 
Farnsworth said the section changed things by only adding equal pro-
tection.58  He must have assumed that states were already prohibited 
from abridging rights in the Bill of Rights such as due process.  A few 
seem to have read the Privileges or Immunities Clause or the entire 
first section as an anti-discrimination provision.59 
Some equated Section 1 with the Civil Rights Act, apparently also 
assuming that the Act encompassed a federal standard of due proc-
ess.60  The Civil Rights Act had guaranteed to all citizens the full and 
 
 52 Id. at 2765–66. 
 53 Id. at 1294 (statement of Rep. Wilson). 
 54 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2766 (1866) (statement of Sen. Howard). 
 55 Id. at 2765. 
 56 Id. at 2542 (statement of Rep. Bingham). 
 57 Id. 
 58 Id. at 2539 (statement of Rep. Farnsworth). 
 59 Id. at 2511 (statement of Rep. Eliot); id. at 2883 (statement of Rep. Latham stating:  “the 
‘civil rights bill’ . . . covers exactly the same ground as this amendment,” which could only 
be true if the Civil Rights Act contained the Due Process Clause, in which it would not be 
merely an anti-discrimination provision). 
 60 Cf. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2498 (1866) (statement of Rep. Bromall); id. at 
1263 (statement of Rep. Bromall); id. at 2459 (statement of Rep. Stevens saying that it is 
partly true that the Amendment secures the same things as the Civil Rights Bill, but a law 
is repealable by a majority). 
July 2009] THE KLAN, THE CONGRESS, AND THE COURT 1393 
 
equal benefit of all laws and provisions for the security of person and 
property as enjoyed by white citizens.  The phrase, laws for the secu-
rity of person and property, had long been used to describe rights 
such as those in the federal Bill of Rights.  Some contemporaries read 
the Civil Rights Act to protect Bill of Rights liberties.  Senator Dixon, 
for example, said the Civil Rights Act protected free speech through-
out the United States;61 a Republican newspaper made a similar asser-
tion.62 
For historical questions, often the best we can achieve is a hy-
pothesis that fits the facts better than competing ones.  A number of 
methods of legal and historical interpretation support the hypothesis 
that the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States in-
cluded rights in the Bill of Rights.  Again, the meaning of the Privi-
leges or Immunities Clause matters for congressional enforcement of 
the Fourteenth Amendment because the Clause is part of what Con-
gress will be enforcing. 
IV.  INTERPRETING PRIVILEGES OR IMMUNITIES 
A.  Textual Analysis 
1.  Contemporary Usage:  Original Meaning 
From the American Revolution through the framing of the Four-
teenth Amendment, fundamental rights such as those in the Bill of 
Rights were repeatedly described as “privileges” and “immunities.”  
There are hundreds of examples, including from the Zenger trial, 
and from controversies over ratification of the Constitution, over the 
Sedition Act, and over the free speech and press right to criticize sla-
very.63  For present purposes one example will need to suffice.  In 
 
 61 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2332 (1866) (statement of Sen. Dixon); Michael Kent 
Curtis, Resurrecting the Privileges or Immunities Clause and Revising the Slaughter-House Cases 
Without Exhuming Lochner:  Individual Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, 38 B.C. L. REV. 
1, 52 (1996).  See generally id. at 51–65 (responding to “nothing but equality” readings of 
Section 1). 
 62 STEPHEN P. HALBROOK, FREEDMEN, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT, AND THE RIGHT TO 
BEAR ARMS, 1866–1876, at 31 (1998) (quoting Editorial, NEW YORK EVENING POST, Apr. 7, 
1866, at 2, col. 1:  Civil Rights Act “seeks to provide a remedy . . . that there will be 
no . . . attempts to prevent [‘colored men’] holding public assemblies, freely discussing 
the question of their own disabilities, keeping fire-arms”). 
 63 See, e.g., CURTIS, NO STATE SHALL ABRIDGE, supra note 2, at 64–65 (pointing to the use of 
the words privileges or immunities by William Penn, William Blackstone, and American 
Revolutionaries); id. at 43 (pointing to usage by abolitionist legal theorist Joel Tiffany); id. 
at 37–38 (describing usage by James Wilson, chairman of the Judiciary Committee in the 
39th Congress).  See generally Michael Kent Curtis, Historical Linguistics, Inkblots, and Life 
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proposing the Bill of Rights to the first Congress, James Madison had 
included guarantees of rights aimed against the states—for free press, 
jury trial, and rights of conscience.  Madison explained that states 
were as likely to attack the “invaluable privileges” as the federal gov-
ernment was.64 
2.  Technical Legal Meaning 
In contrast to the way the Framers of the Bill of Rights, newspaper 
commentators, framers of the Fourteenth Amendment, many con-
gressmen, and many others used the words “privileges” and “immuni-
ties,” one might insist on a technical legal meaning.  The phrase “pri-
vileges or immunities of citizens of the United States” does not appear 
elsewhere in the Constitution.  Dred Scott however described each and 
every constitutional right collectively as rights, privileges, and immu-
nities belonging to citizens of the United States.65  Dred Scott used the 
word “right” and the word “privilege” interchangeably, noting that 
one “right” of citizens of the United States was the “privilege” of suing 
in federal court.66  Dred Scott also treated every constitutional right, 
privilege, or immunity as belonging only to citizens of the United 
States, a category that excluded all descendants of slaves.67  Republi-
cans rejected that and the Fourteenth Amendment corrected that 
holding.  The word privilege was also a common way lawyers de-
scribed Bill of Rights liberties such a free speech and press.  Under 
 
After Death:  The Privileges or Immunities of Citizens of the United States, 78 N.C. L. REV. 1071 
(2000).  Cf. CURTIS, NO STATE SHALL ABRIDGE, supra note 2 at 199–200 (pointing to the 
usage of the words “privileges or immunities” by the Court in Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S 
319, 325–26 (1937), to describe all the rights in the Bill of Rights, while holding that not 
all limited the states). 
 64 BERNARD SCHWARTZ, 2 THE BILL OF RIGHTS:  A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 1033 (Leon 
Friedman et al. eds., 1971). 
 65 Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 403 (1856) (“The question is simply this:  
Can a negro, whose ancestors were imported into this country, and sold as slaves, [be-
come part of the political community created by the Constitution], and as such become 
entitled to all the rights, and privileges, and immunities, guarantied by that instrument to 
the citizen?  One of which rights is the privilege of suing in a court of the United 
States . . . .”). 
 66 Id.  For additional uses of the phrase, sometimes referring to national constitutional 
rights, see id. at 403–06, 411–13, 415–16, 425–26, 449. 
 67 Id. at 411 (stating that the blessings of liberty and the powers granted and the privileges 
secured to the citizen were reserved to citizens of the United States, a class that excluded 
Americans of African descent—free or slave—who were descended from slaves).  On the 
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment in light of prior law, see William Winslow Cross-
key, Charles Fairman, “Legislative History,” and the Constitutional Limitations on State Authority, 
22 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 4–7 (1954).  The path of better understanding the application of the 
Bill of Rights to the states was blazed by Professor Crosskey. 
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Barron v. Baltimore68 states had been free to abridge these privileges 
and immunities.  “No state shall” were the words Barron said should 
be used to change that.  So the argument for the legal meaning of 
the Fourteenth Amendment is also strong—no State shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities [rights] of [shared by all] citizens of the 
United States [all their constitutional rights]. 
B.  Context or Inter-textual Analysis 
When the Framers of the original Constitution put limits on the 
states in the interest of liberty in Article I, Section 10, they used the 
“no State shall” language.69  When they wanted to strongly protect a 
liberty from being denied in the First Amendment, they prohibited 
abridging it.70 
C.  Precedent 
Barron v. Baltimore71 held the Bill of Rights did not limit the states.  
Had the framers intended the rights to limit the states, Chief Justice 
Marshall said they would have used the “no State shall” language.  
The Amendment did use exactly that language.  John Bingham ex-
plained in 1871 that he used the words “no State shall” to comply 
with Barron’s formula.72 
D.  Historic Grievances 
Discrimination against Americans of African descent was a sub-
stantial part of the history leading up to the Fourteenth Amendment, 
but only one part.  So were denials of free speech, press, and free ex-
ercise of religion (to critics of slavery), and searches and cruel pun-
ishments to enforce suppression of speech.  One of the nation’s two 
major political parties was unable to campaign or even exist in the 
South.  Having been targeted, Republicans were keenly aware of the 
denials of speech and other liberties in the interest of slavery.  These 
grievances were repeatedly discussed in the 38th Congress that abol-
ished slavery and in the 39th Congress that framed the Fourteenth 
 
 68 Barron v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 250 (1833). 
 69 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10. 
 70 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 71 Barron, 32 U.S. at 250. 
 72 CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. 84 (1871) (statement of Rep. Bingham explain-
ing that he re-read Barron and followed its suggestion to use the same—“no State shall”—
form used by the Framers of the original Constitution when they set limits on the states). 
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Amendment.73  The need to protect free speech and constitutional 
rights of American citizens was commonly mentioned in the election 
campaign of 1866.74  The 1866 congressional election was a referen-
dum on the Fourteenth Amendment as a basis for reconstruction. 
E.  Original Understandings 
Many Congressmen and other opinion leaders in 1866 described 
the Fourteenth Amendment as protecting Americans in all their con-
stitutional rights or in all the rights of American citizens.75  As noted 
above, some instead described the Amendment as equivalent to the 
Civil Rights Act, a claim that assumes that at least one Bill of Rights 
liberty (due process) was subsumed in the Civil Rights Act’s protec-
tions.  No one explicitly contradicted Congressman Bingham’s or 
Senator Howard’s statements indicating that the Amendment would 
protect Bill of Rights liberties from the states.  In the 1871 speech 
where he explained why he changed the form of the Amendment to 
comply with Barron, Bingham also explained that the privileges or 
immunities were chiefly contained in the first eight Amendments, 
which he proceeded to read word for word.76 
Of course, that leaves open the question of what the guarantees 
included in privileges or immunities, such as free speech and free 
press, meant to Bingham, other framers, and people in 1866–1868.  
History sheds some light on that subject.  As to free speech and press, 
for example, the rich history of free speech controversies from 1798 
through to Civil War (a history often alluded to in the 38th and 39th 
Congresses) negates the idea that the guarantees were thought mere-
ly to protect against prior restraint.  The idea that supporters of the 
Amendment would agree that one could not be restrained from pub-
lishing an anti-slavery book or newspaper but could be imprisoned, 
whipped, or hung after publication is belied by this history.77 
 
 73 E.g., CURTIS, NO STATE SHALL ABRIDGE, supra note 2, at 36–56; CURTIS, FREE SPEECH, supra 
note 2, at 271–99, 357–72. 
 74 CURTIS, NO STATE SHALL ABRIDGE, supra note 2, at 131–53. 
 75 Id. at 89–90 (including some descriptions of Section 1); 131–33 (including somewhat di-
vergent ones); 140–45 (including discussion in the 1866 campaign). 
 76 CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. 84 (1871) (statement of Rep. Bingham). 
 77 See, e.g., CURTIS, FREE SPEECH, supra note 2 at 271–299, 357–383 (showing that Republican 
concerns about suppression of free speech in the South by law were focused on subse-
quent punishment, not prior restraint). 
July 2009] THE KLAN, THE CONGRESS, AND THE COURT 1397 
 
F.  Structure 
Representative government requires free speech, free press, and 
the right to assemble and associate for political purposes, as well as, 
of course, a meaningful and protected right to vote.  The other guar-
antees of the Bill of Rights also reinforce personal liberty and politi-
cal freedom.  As Professor Calabresi has wisely noted,78 a racial caste 
system is essentially totalitarian.  Robust protection of the rights in 
the Bill of Rights is incompatible with a totalitarian system.  Both sla-
very and a racial caste system are severely threatened by the freedoms 
in the Bill of Rights. 
Popular sovereignty is a basic structural principle of American 
constitutional government.79  The Constitution should be interpreted 
to support its basic structure and to provide basic guarantees in order 
for representative government to work.  In the years leading up to the 
Civil War, the South became a closed society.  Southern states (and 
the Kansas territory) and mobs suppressed speech, press, assembly, 
religious expression, and political association and expression on the 
central issue facing the United States in the years leading up to the 
Civil War.  That history shows how important these guarantees are for 
a healthy democracy.  A healthy democracy is crucial so disputes can 
be settled by peaceful means, not by civil war.  Rights of speech, press, 
assembly, political association, and voting were attacked again by ter-
rorism during Reconstruction. 
V.  RECONSTRUCTION AND POLITICAL TERROR 
Except for Tennessee, which was readmitted to Congress, the 
Southern states at first rejected the Fourteenth Amendment.  Con-
gress established military Reconstruction.  Before readmission to 
Congress the states were required to ratify the Fourteenth Amend-
ment and to establish constitutions acceptable to Congress.  Congress 
required the former Confederate States to elect state constitutional 
conventions by manhood suffrage—so it required enfranchisement of 
recently freed slaves.80  Former rebels who had taken an oath to sup-
 
 78 Steven G. Calabresi, oral presentation at the National Constitution Center evening pro-
gram, Nov. 14, 2008. 
 79 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. pmbl. (“We the People of the United States . . . do ordain and estab-
lish this Constitution for the United States of America.”); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 
Cranch) 137, 176 (1803) (“That the people have an original right to establish, for their 
future government, such principles as, in their opinion, shall most conduce to their own 
happiness, is the basis, on which the whole American fabric has been erected.”). 
 80 See, e.g., Act of Apr. 10, 1870, ch. 17, 16 Stat. 40. 
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port the Constitution and who had supported the Confederacy were 
not allowed to vote for the Constitutional Conventions.  The new 
state constitutions enfranchised the newly freed slaves.  Most of the 
new state constitutions also enfranchised all former rebels.81  Under 
Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment, former rebels who had tak-
en and broken an oath of allegiance to the United States (most of the 
pre-civil War political elite) were disqualified to hold state or federal 
office until Congress removed the disability.  Congress removed the 
disability in 1872.82 
A.  The Fifteenth Amendment 
The Fifteenth Amendment was proposed by the Congress in 1868 
and ratified in 1870.  It provided that “[t]he right of citizens of the 
United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United 
States or by any state on account of race, color, or previous condition 
of servitude.”83 
Republican critics of the Amendment favored broader guarantees 
of the right to vote, something approaching universal male suffrage.  
They presciently warned that the Fifteenth Amendment could be 
evaded by all sorts of methods that disfranchised people on a basis 
other than race (literacy tests for example)—but that had the effect of 
disfranchising blacks.84 
B.  Terror as a Political Weapon 
For a time, multi-racial democracy worked.  A white-black Repub-
lican political coalition controlled Southern states.85  But, the Ku Klux 
Klan (“KKK”) and similar organizations soon undertook a campaign 
of political terror against white and black Republicans.  Congress re-
sponded with acts designed to enforce the Fourteenth and Fifteenth 
Amendments.86 
One stark fact emerges from a study of Reconstruction and the 
debates on the Ku Klux Klan Enforcement Act of 1871.  The Klan was 
targeting Republicans, black and white.  The victims of its political 
 
 81 FONER, supra note 4, at 276–80; RICHARD B. MORRIS, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN HISTORY 
246–49 (1953); Chin & Wagner, supra note 2, at 80, 82. 
 82 FONER, supra note 4, at 504. 
 83 U.S. Const. amend. XV. 
 84 See ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE:  THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF DEMOCRACY IN 
THE UNITED STATES 94–102 (2000) (describing framing debates and the failure to include 
a broader guarantee of the right to vote in the Fifteenth Amendment). 
 85 FONER, supra note 4, at 587; Chin & Wagner, supra note 2, at 82–83. 
 86 Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 114 16 Stat. 140; Act of Apr. 20, 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13. 
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terrorism were people who led or supported the Republican Party in 
the South.  As a result, simple protection against racially motivated 
violence would have been inadequate—important, but not sufficient.  
Requiring racial motivation was problematic because blacks were of-
ten targeted because of their political activity.  In addition, Americans of 
African descent would become far more vulnerable without their 
white allies and without a bi-racial Republican party.  Once their op-
ponents captured state government, they became extremely vulner-
able. 
In the debates on the 1871 KKK act, Senator Ames of Mississippi 
recounted attacks on Republican speakers and meetings in Missis-
sippi.  It was, he said, impossible to advocate Republicans’ principles 
in some counties.87  Ames recounted a politically inspired riot in Me-
ridian, Mississippi.  The murder victims included a white Republican 
judge who supported black rights.88  In Louisiana, Ames noted, there 
had been 859 political murders of Republicans.  No murders were 
prosecuted.  “[W]hat political party at the North can retain its vigor 
and lose yearly in each State by murder eight hundred of its best and 
most reliable workers?”89  He warned that “[f]uture contests for party 
supremacy will be but repetitions of the past; and unless the Govern-
ment interferes hundreds and hundreds of men are yet to be made 
martyrs for opinion’s sake.”90 
Ames recognized that while whites were also victims, Americans of 
African descent had the most to lose.  “And when this ‘white man’s 
party’ shall dominate, should it ever, you will see class legislation so 
harsh and so cruel as . . . to force the colored people into a serfdom 
worse than slavery . . . .”91  Witness after witness in Congressional 
hearings described shootings and beatings designed to “run . . . off 
[those who] voted the Radical ticket.”92  Senator Hoar described 
“large numbers of our fellow-citizens . . . deprived of the enjoyment 
of the fundamental rights of citizens.”  The deprivations occurred be-
cause of loyalty to the country and “because [of] their opinions on 
questions of public interest.”93  Violence was intensely political. 
Representative Perry described attacks against politically active 
blacks and their white allies: 
 
 87 CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 196 (1871). 
 88 Id. 
 89 Id. at 197. 
 90 Id. 
 91 Id. 
 92 Id. at 321 (statement of Rep. Stoughton, recounting testimony before Congress; question 
by Senator Nye). 
 93 Id. at 332 (statement of Sen. Hoar). 
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The aim appears to be to put them under fear, so they will be silent when 
freemen should speak, and will stay at home when freemen should be at 
the polls; or, failing in that, to compel them to abandon citizenship in 
that part of the country; or, failing in that, to murder and mutilate them, 
disperse their families, burn their houses, and steal or destroy their 
property.94 
Speaker after speaker, quoting witness after witness, told the same 
story:  violence was aimed at whites and blacks as a means to regain 
political dominance. 
Representative Rainey of South Carolina, the first American of Af-
rican descent elected to the House of Representatives, said that if 
“the negroes . . . would only cast their votes in the interest of the De-
mocratic party, all open measures against them would be immediately 
suspended, and their rights, as American citizens, recognized.”95  But 
he said, “we love freedom more, vastly more, than slavery.”96 
C.  Enforcement Acts 
The Enforcement Act of 187097 focused mainly on attempting to 
protect Fifteenth Amendment rights.  It reached both state actors 
and private persons who interfered with the right to vote of those 
protected by the Fifteenth Amendment.98  Section 5 punished any 
person who  
shall prevent, hinder, control, or intimidate, or shall attempt to prevent, 
hinder, control, or intimidate, any person from exercising . . . the right 
of suffrage, to whom the right of suffrage is . . . guaranteed by the fif-
teenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States, by means of 
bribery, threats, or threats of depriving such person of employment or 
occupation [or other specified means of economic coercion].99 
The section failed to require that the intimidation be because of race, 
and indictments drawn without those allegations proved problematic. 
As to the sections dealing with private actors, Democratic senators 
and representatives insisted that the Fifteenth Amendment was lim-
ited to state action.  By this view, private action directed at intimidat-
ing and punishing voters was not within the scope of the Amend-
ment.100  Though state action was undoubtedly a problem, a major 
 
 94 Id. at app. 78 (statement of Rep. Perry). 
 95 Id. at 394 (statement of Rep. Rainey). 
 96 Id. 
 97 Act of May 31, 1870, ch 114, 16 Stat. 140 (1870). 
 98 Id. at §§ 1–5. 
 99 Id. at § 5. 
100 See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d. Sess. app. 353–54 (1870) (statement of Sen. Ham-
ilton); id. at app. 472 (statement of Sen. Casserly). 
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problem facing Republicans in the South was private action designed 
to intimidate voters. 
The 1870 Act also had a provision seeking to enforce the Four-
teenth Amendment.  Section 6 punished  
two or more persons [who] band or conspire together, or go in disguise 
upon the public highway, or upon the premises of another, with intent to 
violate any provision of this act, or to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimi-
date any citizens with intent to prevent or hinder his free exercise and 
enjoyment of any right or privilege granted or secured to him by the 
Constitution . . . of the United States, or because of his having exercised 
the same.101 
The most extensive debate on constitutional power to reach pri-
vate violence came in connection with the 1871 Act to Enforce the 
Fourteenth Amendment.102  Since a major problem was “private” po-
litical violence, the act had sections reaching violence by “private” 
people aimed at private persons.  But it also reached state actors:  any 
person,  
who, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or 
usage of any State, shall subject, or cause to be subjected, any person 
within the jurisdiction of the United States to the deprivation of any 
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution of the Unit-
ed States . . . shall be liable to the party injured in any action at law or suit 
in equity.103 
Section 2 reached private persons who conspire or  
go in disguise upon the public highway or upon the premises of another 
for the purposes, either directly or indirectly, of depriving any person or 
class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or equal privileges or 
immunities under the laws, or for the purpose of preventing or hinder-
ing the constituted authorities of any State from giving or securing to all 
persons within such State the equal protection of the laws, or shall con-
spire together for the purpose of in any manner impeding, [etc.] the due 
and equal protection of the laws.104  
Violators were subject to fine and imprisonment.  In addition, in case 
any person acted in furtherance of the conspiracy set out above, 
“whereby any person shall be injured in his person or property, or 
deprived of having and exercising any right or privilege of a citizen of 
 
101 Act of May 31, 1870, ch 114, 16 Stat. 140 § 6 (1870). 
102 Act of Apr. 20, 1871. ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (1871). 
103 Id. at § 1. 
104 Id. at § 2.  Other parts of the Act reached persons acting to interfere with federal office 
holders, federal jurors, or grant jurors.  It also reached force or intimidation designed to 
prevent any citizen of the United States lawfully entitled to vote from voting because of 
electoral support or advocacy in connection with any federal office. 
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the United States,” the person injured was given an action for dam-
ages.105 
Sections of the anti-KKK act of 1871 allowed the president to use 
the military to enforce the law where ordinary law enforcement was 
not sufficient.106  These controversial provisions were copied from the 
Fugitive Slave Act of 1850. 
D.  Congressional Debate on Enforcement of the Fourteenth Amendment 
Provisions punishing private persons who interfered with federal 
officers and functions and those that reached persons acting under 
color of law were less controversial.  The sections of the Act that pro-
voked the most debate and disagreement (even among Republicans) 
were those that aimed at private persons who used political violence 
against other private persons—the Klansmen who beat, murdered, 
and abused black and white Republicans. 
Democrats (and a few Republicans) embraced the state action syl-
logism107:  the Fourteenth Amendment only prohibited state action; 
private Klansmen were not the state; therefore the enforcement of 
the Amendment could not reach private persons.  By this view, the 
Fourteenth Amendment (and the Fifteenth) did not create rights.  
They only imposed limits on government.  Since people had no rights 
under these Amendments, there were no federal rights to enforce.108  
Republicans gave several responses. 
Representative Samuel Shellabarger of Ohio defended an early 
version of the 1871 Act which protected privileges or immunities of 
citizens of the United States. 
[W]hen the United States inserted into its Constitution . . . that the peo-
ple of this country, born or naturalized therein, are citizens of the United 
States and of the States also in which they reside, and that Congress shall 
have power to enforce by appropriate legislation the requirement that 
their privileges and immunities as citizens should not be abridged, it was 
done for a purpose, and that purpose was that the United States thereby 
were authorized to directly protect and defend throughout the United 
States those privileges and immunities which are in their nature ‘funda-
mental’ . . . and which inhere and belong of right to the citizenship of all 
free Governments.  The making of them United States citizens and au-
thorizing Congress by appropriate law to protect that citizenship gave 
 
105 Id. 
106 Id. at § 4. 
107 CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. 114 (1871) (statement of Rep. Farnsworth per-
taining to the Fourteenth Amendment); id. at app. 208 (statement of Rep. Blair). 
108 Id.; see Cruikshank v. United States, 92 U.S. 542, 553–55 (1875) (containing a judicial 
statement of the state action syllogism). 
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Congress power to legislate directly for the enforcement of such rights as 
are fundamental elements of citizenship.109 
Shellabarger then cited Corfield v. Coryell110 as to privileges and immu-
nities under Article IV.  That case that seemed to give those privileges 
a fundamental rights reading.   
[W]hat are the privileges and immunities of citizens of the several States?  
We feel no hesitation in confining these expressions to those privileges 
and immunities which are in their nature fundamental, which belong of 
right to the citizens of all free Governments. . . . They may . . . be all 
comprehended under the following general heads:  protection by the 
Government; . . . the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the right to ac-
quire and possess property of every kind, and to pursue and obtain hap-
piness and safety, subject nevertheless to such restrains as the Govern-
ment may justly prescribe for the general good of the whole.111 
To respond to the state action syllogism Shellabarger compared 
the Fugitive Slave Clause to the first Section of the Fourteenth 
Amendment: 
No person held to service of labor in one State, under the laws thereof, 
escaping into another, shall, in consequence of any law or regulation 
therein, be discharged from such service or labor, but shall be delivered 
up on the claim of the party to whom such service or labor may be due.112 
“Now notice,” Shellabarger said, “that this provision is in restraint of 
the power of the States, just as the first section of the fourteenth 
amendment is in its last three clauses: 
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privi-
leges or immunities of citizens of the United States.”113 
Both Clauses, he said, were prohibitions on the states, withholding 
power from the states.  They were similar except that the Fugitive 
Slave Clause had no enforcement clause (in contrast to Section 5 of 
the Fourteenth Amendment).  The Fugitive Slave Clause was “merely 
a negation upon the power of the States, and an abstract statement 
that the fugitive shall be delivered upon claim.”114  Yet to enforce this 
negative limit on the states, in 1850 Congress made it a crime for pri-
vate persons to assist or harbor an escaping slave and the Supreme 
 
109 CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. 69 (1871) (statement of Rep. Shellabarger). 
110 Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3230). 
111 CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. 69 (1871) (quoting Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. at 
551). 
112 Id. at app. 70. 
113 Id. 
114 Id. 
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Court held that the Fugitive Slave Law of 1850 was constitutional in 
all respects.115 
The analogy suggested by Shellabarger is persuasive.  Stripped of 
its euphemisms the Fugitive Slave Clause provided: 
No [slave] held to service or labor in one State, under the laws thereof, 
escaping into another shall, in consequence of any law or regulation 
therein, be discharged from such [slavery], but shall be delivered up on 
the claim of the [slave owner].116 
The clause would mean the same thing had it said: 
No state shall by any law or regulation free any slave escaping from an-
other state, but the slave shall be delivered upon the claim of the slave 
owner. 
From a limit on the states in the Fugitive Slave Clause, the Court 
in Prigg v. Pennsylvania implied a right of the slave owner to get the 
slave back.  From that right, it implied the power of Congress to cre-
ate a remedy reaching private persons, not just state actors.  As Rep-
resentative Shellabarger explained: 
[I]n 1850 . . . [you] legislated a criminal code; you made the harboring 
of a slave, you made the refusal to return the slave . . . criminal and in-
dictable in the courts of the United States, and all in enforcement of a 
provision purely negative as to the States . . . . You did everything that is 
done by this bill . . . . And yet that legislation . . . stood for fifty years.  It 
has stood affirmed, from Prigg vs. Pennsylvania down through the years  
. . . in every court of the United States; affirmed upon that mere negation 
upon the power of the States [that] it was the right of Congress to en-
force its provisions by affirmative law, both civil and criminal . . . . 
And . . . shall it be endured now that those decisions which were invoked 
and sustained in favor of bondage shall be stricken down when first 
called upon and invoked in behalf of human rights and American citi-
zenship? . . . So long as your Constitution continues to guaranty the 
rights of American citizenship, so long you can . . . enforce these rights of 
American citizenship.117 
Shellabarger’s definition of privileges and immunities did not ex-
clude Bill of Rights liberties, but also did not explicitly include them.  
To critics, the invocation of Corfield seemed to give the federal gov-
 
115 Id. (statement of Rep. Shellabarger); see Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet) 539 
(1842) (citing the Fugitive Slave Act of 1793).  Section 4 of that Act punished persons 
who knowingly harbored or concealed a fugitive slave or willfully obstructed the claimant 
in recapturing his or her slave.  Fugitive Slave Act of 1793, ch. 7, sec. 1, 1 Stat. 302 (1793).  
See also Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506, 526 (1859) (proclaiming the 1850 Fugi-
tive Slave Act constitutional in all respects).  The 1850 statute punished persons who 
knowingly directly or indirectly assisted a fugitive slave in escaping or harbored or con-
cealed the slave.  Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, ch. 60, sec. 7, 9 Stat. 462, 464 (1850). 
116 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2. 
117 CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. 70 (1871) (statement of Rep. Shellabarger). 
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ernment broad power to legislate over subjects of traditional state 
concern.  Shellabarger noted one limit:  Congress was legislating only 
when the “private” crime was motivated by the intent to deprive citi-
zens of their privileges or immunities.118 
John A. Bingham’s explanation of the privileges or immunities of 
citizens of the United States was different.  They were chiefly those set 
forth in the Bill of Rights.  To identify them Bingham read word for 
word the first eight Amendments to the Constitution.119  Before the 
Fourteenth Amendment, Bingham noted, “the State could deny to 
any citizen the right of trial by jury, and it was done.  Before that the 
State could abridge the freedom of the press, and it was done in half 
of the States of the Union.”120 
Bingham had earlier embraced a fundamental rights reading of 
Article IV.  But in 1869 in Paul v. Virginia,121 the Supreme Court had 
treated the Article IV privileges and immunities as protecting out-of-
staters from discrimination in rights the state provided to its own citi-
zens.  Bingham now read Corfield the same way.  He said Corfield had 
“only held that in civil rights the State could not refuse to extend to 
citizens of other States the same general rights secured to its own.”122  
But  
other and different privileges and immunities than those to which a citi-
zen of a State was entitled are secured by the provision of the fourteenth 
article, that no State shall abridge the privileges and immunities of citi-
zens of the United States, which are defined in the eight articles of 
amendment.123 
Bingham said that Congress could pass “laws for enforcing all the 
privileges and immunities of the citizens of the United States, as gua-
rantied by the amended Constitution and expressly enumerated in 
the Constitution.”124  These guarantees were essential to American na-
tionality.  “The people of the United States are entitled to have their 
rights guarantied to them by the Constitution of the United States, 
protected by national law.”125  What, Bingham asked, would the gov-
ernment be worth if it “must rely upon States to execute its grants of 
power, its limitations of power upon States and its express guarantees 
 
118 Id. at app. 69–70. 
119 Id. at app. 84 (statement of Rep. Bingham). 
120 Id. 
121 Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 180–81 (1869). 
122 CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. 84 (1871) (statement of Rep. Bingham). 
123 Id. 
124 Id. 
125 Id. at app. 85. 
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of rights to the people.”126  Congressional statutes could be preventa-
tive as well as remedial.  “Why not in advance provide against the de-
nial of rights by States, whether the denial be acts of omission or 
commission, as well as against the unlawful acts of combinations and 
conspiracies against the rights of the people?”127  For Bingham, con-
gressional power to protect the rights of citizens did not exclude the 
states:  “the States have concurrent power to enforce the Constitu-
tion.”128 
Congress had previously enforced the negative provisions of the 
Fifteenth Amendment.  “What difference is there between enforcing 
the negative provision of the fifteenth amendment and enforcing a 
negative provision of the thirteenth and fourteenth amendments?  
There is no difference . . . .”129  For Bingham the rights in the Bill of 
Rights, now secured against federal or state invasion, were rights of 
American citizens.  They were national rights Congress could protect. 
Bingham was faced with the claim that the change in the form of 
the Amendment showed that federal enforcement of the rights 
against private individuals in the states was foreclosed.  He explained 
that he had changed the form of his Amendment to comply with the 
way Chief Justice Marshall had said limits on state power would have 
had to be crafted to prevent state violation of Bill of Rights liberties.130  
Marshall had said that “no State shall” language was necessary to es-
tablish a limit on the states.131  For Bingham, the revised Amendment 
was stronger than its predecessor, because it now explicitly limited 
the states and allowed congressional enforcement. 
Other congressmen also said that privileges or immunities in-
cluded those in the Bill of Rights.  Congressman Dawes noted that in 
addition to privileges and immunities under the original Constitu-
tion, other privileges or immunities were added.  To illustrate these 
privileges or immunities Congressman Dawes cited one-by-one the 
guarantees of the Bill of Rights.  Then he noted the immunity from 
slavery under the Thirteenth Amendment.  After listing all these pri-
vileges and immunities in the original Constitution, the Bill of Rights, 
 
126 Id. 
127 Id. 
128 Id. 
129 Id. 
130 Id. at app. 84 (“In reëxamining the case of Barron . . . I noted and apprehended as I nev-
er did before, certain words in that opinion of Marshall. . . . ‘Had the framers of these 
amendments intended them to be limitations on the power of the Sate governments they 
would have imitated the framers of the original Constitution and have expressed that in-
tention [by using “no State shall”].’”. 
131 Id. at app. 83–84. 
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and the Thirteenth Amendment, Dawes referred to the Fourteenth.  
“Still further, every person born on the soil was made a citizen and 
clothed with them all.”132 
Dawes clearly thought the Bill of Rights guarantees did not ex-
haust the privileges or immunities of American citizens.  In any case, 
however, whoever “invades, trenches upon, or impairs one iota or tit-
tle of the least of them, to that extent trenches upon the Constitution 
and laws of the United States, and this Constitution authorizes us to 
bring him before the courts to answer therefor.”133 
Representative Hoar also said that privileges or immunities “com-
prehend[] all the privileges and immunities declared to belong to 
the citizen by the Constitution itself” plus “those . . . which all repub-
lican writers of authority agree in declaring fundamental and essen-
tial to citizenship.”134  He cited and relied also on Corfield.135 
Hoar also relied on the guarantee of a republican form of gov-
ernment.  A government might formally be republican, with all the 
requisite guarantees in its constitution and laws, but still fail to be a 
republican government.  In South Carolina, he said, more than three-
fifths of the population was Negroes, and still a larger number were 
Republicans: 
Now, suppose that in that State, with its constitution providing for trial by 
jury, providing an independent judiciary, and providing for equality of 
civil rights, providing for the right to vote and to hold office of every citi-
zen, there should be a conspiracy upon the part of a certain portion of 
the people that by intimidation, by murder, by outrage, this majority of 
the people dare not exercise those rights which their State constitution 
undertakes to declare for them.136 
In that case, Hoar believed that Congress could and should act. 
According to Hoar, Congress could not interfere to remedy ordi-
nary imperfections.  But “wherever these evils have attained such a 
degree as amounts to the destruction, to the overthrow, to the denial 
to large classes of the people of the blessings of republican govern-
ment altogether,” Congress should act to protect the rights denied to 
a large class of citizens.137  Congress was the judge of the necessity.  
The Equal Protection Clause was an additional source of congres-
sional power.  When states systematically failed to secure equal pro-
 
132 Id. at 475–76 (statement of Rep. Dawes). 
133 Id. at 476. 
134 Id. at 334 (statement of Rep. Hoar). 
135 Id. 
136 Id. at 333. 
137 Id. at 334. 
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tection, Congress could and should have acted to protect citizens’ 
rights.138 
As Hoar recognized, denials of basic rights were nothing new.  
History did not suggest that the states would correct the problem.  In 
a large part of the Union, slaves had been denied “all rights, civil, po-
litical, and personal.”139 
So far was there from being any tendency to correct this evil under the 
operation of existing State constitutions, that the civil right of discussing 
temperately the rightfulness or expediency of this state of things and the 
political right of voting to put an end to it was also denied, with penalty 
of banishment or death to any person of the dominant race whose sense 
of public duty might so incline him.140 
Hoar said, somewhat inaccurately, that the penalty was not “ex-
pressed in terms on the statute-books,” but, he accurately noted, it 
was enforced by mobs.141 
Congressman Monroe insisted that  
[a] constitution is a means, and not an end. Life, liberty, and happiness 
do not exist for the sake of the constitution, but the constitution exists 
and was framed for their sake . . . .  [T]here is a fair presumption that it 
contains sufficient grants of power to the legislative body to secure the 
great primal objects for which constitutions and Governments exist.142 
For Monroe “every free constitution” evolved in similar ways.  
These free governments had a “natural growth,” a growth that did 
not come only from amendment or change of the letter or spirit.143  
“It is not the intrusion of new principles, but it is the more extended 
application of old ones.  Principles have commonly a much wider ap-
plication than we suspect.”144 
A new application of a well-known principle, whether in morals, in sci-
ence, or in the organic law of the land, takes us by surprise . . . yet it is 
only what is required by the most logical consistency.  When we first study 
the constitution of a free country we think of its principles only as appli-
cable to that state of society and to those needs of the people which then 
exist and with which we are familiar.  But, in time, new circumstances 
arise, new social conditions appear, and minds will then be found who 
will propose to include the new phenomena under the old rule.  This will 
startle many as an innovation, as a violation of the constitution, whereas 
 
138 Id. 
139 Id. at 335. 
140 Id. 
141 Id. 
142 Id. at 370 (statement of Rep. Monroe). 
143 Id. 
144 Id. 
July 2009] THE KLAN, THE CONGRESS, AND THE COURT 1409 
 
it may be only the application of known and admitted principles to new 
circumstances.145 
As to privileges and immunities and equal protection, Monroe 
agreed with Hoar.146  Others also read privileges and immunities to 
include rights in the Bill of Rights.  For example, Senator Frelinghuy-
sen cited the takings guarantee as one of the privileges or immunities 
of citizens.147  Representative Hawley included the right to express 
opinions as one right protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.148 
As to equal protection, Frelinghuysen, like Monroe, said states 
could deny equal protection by inaction as well as by action.  A state 
denied equal protection by failing to protect.149  Furthermore, it was 
“the constitutional right and duty of the General Government to see 
to it that the fundamental rights of citizens of the United States are 
protected.”150  How, he asked, could the government “protect the pri-
vileges of citizens of the United States in the States?”151  It could not 
“compel proper legislation and its enforcement; it can only deal with 
the offenders who violate the privileges and immunities of citizens of 
the United States.”152 
For these congressmen and senators, the Privileges or Immunities 
Clause did not simply give Americans of African descent the rights 
enjoyed by whites under state law.  Instead it gave whites and blacks 
national privileges and immunities that should be absolutely un-
abridged. 
Some, of course, expressed more or less divergent views.  Con-
gressman Willard, a Republican of Vermont, insisted that the Privi-
leges or Immunities Clause merely guaranteed equality of privileges 
with other citizens of the state.  He relied on the Civil Rights Act 
(which he read as merely securing equality in rights states provided) 
to prove his point.  Willard saw enforcement of the Fourteenth 
Amendment as initially proposed as a violation of the rights of the 
states.153  People like Willard believed citizens had a right to equality 
under state law.  They may have found the final language of the stat-
ute (punishing private action to deprive people of equal privileges or 
immunities) consistent with their limited view of privileges or immu-
 
145 Id. 
146 Id. 
147 Id. at 499 (statement of Sen. Frelinghuysen). 
148 Id. at 382 (statement of Rep. Hawley). 
149 Id. at 501 (statement of Sen. Frelinghuysen). 
150 Id. 
151 Id. 
152 Id. 
153 Id. at app. 188 (statement of Rep. Willard). 
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nities and therefore acceptable.  At any rate, Willard voted for the fi-
nal version of the bill, which reached private conspiracies.154 
As we have seen, a number of Republicans relied on the Equal 
Protection Clause as a source of federal power to reach private vio-
lence.  By an often expressed view, the Equal Protection Clause, by 
prohibiting state denials of equal protection, required states to provide 
protection of the laws to all.  The Clause went beyond requiring laws 
equal on their face; it also required administration of the law that 
provided equal protection.  To deny protection was to refuse to sup-
ply it.  People had a right to protection of the laws.  Since Southern 
states were unable to supply protection, Congress under Section 5 of 
the Fourteenth Amendment could do so.  As Senator Morton ex-
plained,  
If a State fails to secure to a certain class of people the equal protection 
of the laws, it is exactly equivalent to denying such protection . . . . [It did 
not matter whether the failure was] willful or the result of inabil-
ity . . . . [That was a question] into which it is not important that Con-
gress should enter . . . . If there be organizations in any of the States hav-
ing for their purpose to deny to any class or condition of men equal 
protection, to deny to them the equal enjoyment of rights that are se-
cured by the Constitution of the United States, [it was] the right and duty 
of Congress to make such organizations and combinations an offense 
against the United States . . . . [C]itizens of the United States, whatever 
may be their political views [should have] the equal protection of the 
laws.155 
Referring to the Equal Protection Clause, Senator Edmunds said 
that it meant that the citizen “shall have the protection of the law.  Al-
though the word is negative in form, it is affirmative in its nature and 
character.”156  The Equal Protection theory was not necessarily exclu-
sive.  A number of congressmen believed that Congress had the pow-
er to supply protection when the state failed to do so, and that it also 
had the power to protect any national constitutional right belonging 
to the citizen against a conspiracy aimed specifically at that right. 
Still, a few Republicans accepted the idea that the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause (whatever it meant), the Due Process Clause, and 
the Equal Protection Clause merely limited state power.  One of the 
strongest attacks on an earlier version of the statute came from Con-
gressman Farnsworth of Illinois.  He felt the time for reconstructing 
the South had past.  “We have reconstructed, and rereconstructed, 
and we are asked to reconstruct again . . . .  I fear we are governing 
 
154 Id. at 808 (statement of Rep. Willard, voting with the majority in favor of the act). 
155 Id. at 501 (statement of Sen. Frelinghuysen); id. at app. 251 (statement of Sen. Morton). 
156 Id. at 697. 
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the South too much.”157  Farnsworth believed the proposed version of 
the statute—providing a remedy for conspiracy “to do any act in vio-
lation of the rights, privileges, or immunities of any person, to which 
he is entitled under the Constitution and laws of the United States.” 
and which act would otherwise be criminal under state law158 imper-
iled the federal system.159  “I do not believe in centralization of the 
powers of Government, nor in abolishing the State lines and State 
governments or abridging their powers.”160 
Farnsworth reviewed the congressional debates on Bingham’s pro-
totype.  His review showed significant opposition to the prototype; 
that it was replaced with the current version of Section 1 with privi-
leges or immunities, due process, and equal protection prefaced with 
“no State shall;” and that Bingham and others had referred to the re-
vised version as limiting state power.161 
According to Farnsworth, Section 1 “requires no legislation; ‘it is a 
law unto itself;’ and the courts can execute it.”162  To the extent that it 
excludes the Congress, this view is starkly inconsistent with what lead-
ing framers of the Amendment said when it was being framed in the 
39th Congress.163  At any rate, according to Farnsworth, the Amend-
ment was merely a limit on state power, and congressional power 
could not reach individuals—under equal protection or any other 
theory apparently.164  For Farnsworth there was no middle ground.  
The question was “whether we shall obliterate State lines and abolish 
State constitutions and State Legislatures, and centralize all the pow-
er of these States of ours in one grand despotic, central Government 
at Washington.”165 
A few others took a very narrow view.  Senator Trumbull insisted 
that the Privileges or Immunities Clause had not extended the rights 
and privileges of American citizens “one iota” and he insisted it did 
not protect persons in the states except as to the equality guaranteed 
 
157 Id. at app. 116–17. 
158 Id. at app. 113 (statement of Rep. Farnsworth, referring to what was then the second sec-
tion). 
159 Id. at app. 117. 
160 Id. 
161 See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1063–64 (1866) (statement of Rep. Hale); id. 
at 1095 (statement of Rep. Hotchkiss). 
162 CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. 117 (1871) (statement of Rep. Farnsworth). 
163 E.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2766 (1866) (statement of Sen. Howard) (dis-
cussing how Congress will enforce Section 1 under its enforcement powers in Section 5); 
id. at 2542 (statement of Congressman Bingham). 
164 CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. 117 (1871) (statement of Rep. Farnsworth). 
165 Id. 
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by Article IV, Section 2.166  The states were “the depositories of the 
rights of the individual against encroachment.”167  At any rate the 
Amendment only reached “infringement by law.”168 
In the 39th Congress, Republicans had replaced a provision that 
gave Congress direct power to secure equal protection in life, liberty, 
or property.  The critics understood that provision to allow the Con-
gress to legislate on virtually all state law issues.  They were not then 
facing massive political terrorism, and they did not consider whether 
the revised Amendment would allow Congress more limited power—
to act against private terrorists who acted with the specific intent of 
punishing the exercise of constitutional rights protected in Section 1. 
Congressman Garfield seems to have taken a middle ground.  He 
seemed to read the Privileges or Immunities Clause and the Due 
Process Clause as equivalent to the first section of the Civil Rights 
Act.169 How Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act contained a federal stan-
dard of due process the states were required to obey, Garfield did not 
say.  Taken literally, his remarks suggest he found protection for at 
least one Bill of Rights liberty in the Civil Rights Act. 
As to equal protection, Garfield said he might be pushing the 
words beyond their natural limit, but he believed that the prohibition 
on denying equal protection required the states to provide equal pro-
tection.170  Garfield did say that when the laws of the state were equal 
on their face but systematically not enforced, the Enforcement Clause 
would allow Congress to act to supply Equal Protection: 
Now if the second section of the pending bill can be so amended that 
it . . . shall employ no terms which assert the power of Congress to take 
jurisdiction of the subject until such denial be clearly made, and shall not 
in any way assume the original jurisdiction of the rights of private persons 
and of property within the States . . . I shall give it my hearty support.171 
As finally written, the statute reached private action, and it did not 
condition prosecution on proof of state neglect.172  Still, Garfield 
voted for the final version.173 
The Fifteenth Amendment also had state action language.174  Here 
Garfield found power to reach private violators.  Garfield said that 
 
166 Id. at 576 (statement of Sen. Trumbull). 
167 Id. at 577. 
168 Id. at 576. 
169 Id. at app. 151; but see id. at 152 (statement of Congressman Garfield). 
170 Id. at app. 153. 
171 Id. 
172 Act of Apr. 20, 1871. ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (1871).  
173 CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. at 808 (showing the vote). 
174 See U.S. CONST. amend. XV.  
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the Amendment plus the power of Congress to regulate the time, 
place and manner of elections, “arms Congress with the full power to 
protect the ballot-box at all elections, at least of officers of the United 
States, and to protect the right of all men within the limit of that 
clause to the suffrage.”175  He may have doubted that the Fifteenth 
Amendment alone would be sufficient to reach private violence 
aimed at the right to vote because of race. 
In addition, Garfield found full power to punish persons, includ-
ing private persons, who denied to blacks the rights in the Civil 
Rights Act (which he read to secure equal rights with white men) and 
who violated the right of voters to enjoy the suffrage “guaran-
tied . . . in the main text of the Constitution and in the fifteenth 
amendment.” 176 
Near the end of the debate, Senator Edmunds of Vermont noted 
that the Fourteenth Amendment secured the rights of “white men” as 
much as “colored men.”  He insisted that under the Fourteenth 
Amendment the national government could 
[P]reserve the lives and liberties of white people against attacks by white 
people, against rapine and murder and assassination and conspiracy, 
contrived in order to drive them from the States in which they have been 
born or have chosen to settle, contrived in order to deprive them of the 
liberty of having a political opinion.177 
Moreover, 
The disorders in the South are not like the disorders in many other 
States, where there always are disorders, the results of private malice.  
The slaying of men [in the South], as a rule, is not because the murderer 
and the assassin have any hostility or quarrel with the person who is the 
victim; but it is one step in the progress of a systematic plan and an ulte-
rior purpose, and that is not to leave in any of those States a brave white 
man who dares to be a Republican or a colored man who dares to be a 
voter.178 
The final version of the 1871 Act satisfied most Republicans.  As 
we have seen, it made it a crime for two or more persons to 
conspire together, or go in disguise upon the public highway or upon the 
premises of another for the purpose, either directly or indirectly, of de-
priving any person or any class of persons of the equal protection of the 
laws, or of equal privileges or immunities under the laws, or for the pur-
pose of preventing or hindering the constituted authorities of any State 
from giving or securing to all persons within such State the equal protec-
tion of the laws, or shall conspire together for the purpose of in any 
 
175 CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. 149 (statement of Rep. Garfield).  
176 Id. at app. 153. 
177 Id. at 696 (statement of Sen. Edmunds). 
178 Id. at 702. 
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manner impeding, hindering, obstructing, or defeating the due course of 
justice in any State or Territory, with intent to deny to any citizen of the 
United States the due and equal protection of the laws . . . .179 
Senator Edmunds had explained that the statute would not reach or-
dinary crimes or feuds in a state, but if people conspired to injure a 
person because he was a Democrat, or a Methodist, or a Vermonter 
the section would reach that conduct.180  This suggests that he con-
nected congressional power to privileges protected by the Fourteenth 
Amendment as well as to equal protection. 
E.  The Proper Scope of Congressional Power Under Section 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment 
Some things are clear from Congressional enforcement of the 
Fourteenth Amendment shortly after its ratification.  First, Republi-
cans overwhelmingly concluded that Congress could reach private 
conduct motivated by a specific intent to deprive people of constitu-
tional rights.  Some found the right to protection in the Equal Pro-
tection Clause, some in the right to protect liberties in the Bill of 
Rights, some in the ability to protect less textually explicit fundamen-
tal rights, some in the guarantee of republican government, and 
some in all of these.  Many who found the right to protection under 
Equal Protection found it existed when the state systematically was 
unable or unwilling to supply protection.  But once those facts were 
present—a matter for Congress to decide—Congress could pass a na-
tional statute to be used as necessary. 
Having found widespread violence designed to deprive people of 
their constitutional rights in Southern states, Congress passed a na-
tionwide statute.  It did not limit the law to specific districts where the 
problem currently existed.  Nor did it condition prosecution on any 
finding of a denial of protection by the state.  Congress exercised a 
power to reach private persons who acted with intent to deny to citi-
zens their constitutional rights.  The final language was broad 
enough to cover denials of equal protection, denials of equal consti-
tutional privileges or immunities, and denials of equality under state 
laws.  Prosecutors were not required to prove state neglect, inability, 
or denial.  Virtually all Republicans in the Congress who had been in 
the 39th Congress voted for the final version.181 
 
179 Act of Apr. 20, 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13. 
180 CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 567 (1871). 
181 See, CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 3149 (1866) (indicating House vote on the final 
version of the Fourteenth Amendment); id. at 3042 (showing passage in the Senate). 
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Both the Bingham view of privileges and immunities and the 
Equal Protection theory should have been sufficient to support con-
gressional action reaching private persons who acted with the specific 
intent to punish people for exercising constitutional rights or to de-
ter them from exercising them or to interfere with constitutionally 
mandated equality.  In addition, Congress should have been able to 
reach private action with the specific intent to deprive people of the 
right to vote because of race.  In the case of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, the prohibition against state or federal denial of Bill of Rights 
liberties should be understood as an implicit recognition that Ameri-
can citizens (and as to process rights all persons) had those rights.  
Once one accepts that Americans have a right to free speech and 
press, Congress should have the power to punish the private violence 
undertaken with the specific intent to prevent or punish free speech 
and free press.  Similarly, a lynch mob could be punished (regardless 
of the race of the victim) because it acts with the specific intent to 
deprive the victim of his or her right to a trial in accordance with due 
process. 
When it adopted the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress had been 
concerned both with individual rights and federalism.  It rejected a 
version that many thought permitted Congress to legislate on any and 
every subject of state concern.  The Enforcement Acts did not do 
that.  Because they were limited by a specific intent requirement, they 
left ordinary crimes entirely to the states.  But they reached politically 
motivated attempts to use the tactics of terror to prevent the exercise 
of constitutional rights.  This approach protected the fundamental 
rights of citizens while also protecting the role of the states. 
Congress was attempting to protect the democratic process from 
terrorists.  A court more sympathetic to protection of fundamental 
rights, the democratic process, and the right of the majority to rule 
should have had little difficulty protecting federalism, fundamental 
rights, and the democratic process. 
A structural argument strongly supports congressional power to 
reach violence specifically designed to punish or prevent the exercise 
of constitutional rights.  The principle of popular sovereignty asserts 
that the people have the ultimate political power in both state and 
national governments.  Of course, the class of those entitled to vote 
has expanded over time.  But, subject to constitutional limitations, 
the majority—as the white-black Republican coalition was in most 
 
CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 522 (1871) (showing passage in the House); id. at 709 
(showing Senate passage). 
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Southern states—has a right to govern.  A healthy representative de-
mocracy cannot exist when people on one side of a political dispute 
are systematically murdered, whipped, exiled, and have their houses 
and businesses burned and their animals killed—all because of their 
political opinions.  Federal power used to prevent such terrorist out-
rages does not destroy the role of the states.  States can prosecute 
such crimes under state law as murder, assault, etc.  Preemption of 
such state laws should be foreclosed in the interest of federalism.  In 
the interest of democracy we should remember the Titanic.  Redun-
dant safety devices are a wise idea. 
The first sentence of Section 1 provides for equal citizenship in 
the United States and in the state of the citizen’s residence.182  Citi-
zens who are the victims of a systematic plan to terrorize them be-
cause of their political views are denied the basics of citizenship.  Be-
cause of the nature of republican government, at least all adult 
citizens must have rights of speech, press, petition, and association—
whether or not they are legally entitled to vote.  For those entitled to 
vote, systematic terror designed to prevent them from creating a po-
litical majority denies the essence of equal citizenship.  The first sen-
tence of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment creates a right to 
citizenship.  It is not prefaced with “no State shall.” 
Political terror should also activate congressional power under Ar-
ticle IV, Section 4 of the Constitution:  “[t]he United States shall 
guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Gov-
ernment.”183  No state can be Republican where a minority is permit-
ted to use tactics of terror to deny their opponents the rights of 
speech, press, association, and franchise and to thwart majority 
rule.184 
 
182 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and 
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State 
wherein they reside.  No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privi-
leges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any per-
son of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within 
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”). 
183 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4 (“The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a 
Republican Form of Government, and shall protect each of them against Invasion; and 
on Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature cannot be 
convened) against domestic Violence.”). 
184 See WILLIAM M. WIECEK, THE GUARANTEE CLAUSE OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 24–27 
(1972) (describing the nature of republican government and the obligation imposed by 
the Guarantee Clause); id. at 33 (showing the framers’ concerns with mob violence); id. 
at 42 (delegitimizing extra legal violence through the Guarantee Clause); id. at 57–59 
(securing republican government and securing the states against “dangerous commo-
tions, insurrections and rebellions,” according to James Wilson in the Constitutional 
Convention); id. at 59 (describing Professor Wiecek’s observations that the Clause was de-
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The choice between nationwide statutes (preventative as well as 
remedial) and targeted ones should be up to Congress.  General and 
national statutes have several advantages.  First, they avoid claims that 
one region is being singled out and remove one source of resentment 
and resistance.  More important, they are in place so new outbreaks 
of political terrorism can be dealt with immediately.  Once in place, 
they cannot be blocked in Congress by a faction that stands to benefit 
politically from terrorism.  Failure to have the statutes in place allows 
the forces of terror and fraud to elect their preferred representatives 
and block remedial legislation.  That is what happened in the United 
States after “Redemption.” 
As it confronted claims under the Fourteenth Amendment, the 
Supreme Court often failed to see obvious middle grounds between 
the utter destruction of federalism and protection of the rights of cit-
izens.  For example, in considering the Privileges or Immunities 
Clause in the Slaughter-House Cases,185 the Court presented the choice 
as one between turning all matters of state law over to the federal 
government or limiting the privileges or immunities of citizens to 
things such as the right to visit the sub-treasuries, to be protected on 
the high seas, and to be safe in foreign lands.186  In state action cases, 
allowing Congress under the Fourteenth Amendment to reach pri-
vate violence specifically designed to punish or deter the exercise of 
core constitutional rights would hardly herald the end of the states.187  
Obviously, if congressional power is limited to crimes with the specific 
intent to deprive people of constitutional rights and the doctrine is 
carefully developed with a view to federalism, destruction of the role 
of the states would not follow. 
 
signed to secure internal order, to prevent the establishment of autocratic governments 
in the states, and “third, [to] give broad powers to the federal government over the states 
to achieve the first two objects.”); id. at 67 (explaining that The Federalist 21 suggested that 
the clause was designed to prevent violent changes in republican institutions); id. at 67–
68 (supporting the fact that the clause was designed to assure popular control of govern-
ment, rule by majorities in the states with safeguards for the rights of minorities). 
185 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872). 
186 Id. at 77 (“And where it is declared that Congress shall have the power to enforce that 
article, was it intended to bring within the power of Congress the entire domain of civil 
rights heretofore belonging exclusively to the States?”). 
187 See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 620 (2000) (”These limitations are nec-
essary to prevent the Fourteenth Amendment from obliterating the Framers’ carefully 
crafted balance of power between the States and the National Government.”). 
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VI.  CONGRESSIONAL POWER IN THE COURTS 
In 1871, in United States v. Hall, the Circuit Court for the Southern 
District of Alabama considered an indictment under the section of 
the 1870 statute designed to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment.188  
The government had charged the defendants with conspiring to op-
press, injure, threaten, and intimidate citizens for exercising their 
rights to free speech and freedom to assemble—alleged to be privi-
leges secured to them by the Constitution of the United States.189  The 
defendants moved to dismiss the indictment on the ground that the 
conduct charged did not violate any right or privilege secured by the 
Constitution of the United States.190  Judge Woods wrote the opinion 
(based largely on suggestions he received in correspondence with 
Justice Bradley).191 
The United States’ attorney contended that the rights of free 
speech and assembly, while not granted by the Constitution, were se-
cured by it.192  Speaking for the court, Judge Woods noted that free 
speech and other rights in the first eight amendments were protected 
only against federal, not state, legislation.  They were partially se-
cured.  Still, under the first eight Amendments Congress lacked the 
power to protect the people of a state from their violation.193  But “the 
fourteenth amendment has a vital bearing upon the question.”194  It 
made a person born in the nation a citizen and “entitled to all the 
privileges and immunities secured by the constitution of the United 
States to citizens thereof.”195  The privileges were those that were fun-
damental and that belonged of right to the citizens of all free states.  
“Among these we are safe in including those which in the constitu-
tion are expressly secured to the people, either as against the action 
of the federal or state governments,” including freedom of speech 
and the right peaceably to assemble.196 
Since both Congress and the States were forbidden to impair 
these rights, they were secured to the people.  The Fourteenth 
Amendment gave Congress enforcement power.  Congress had the 
 
188 See United States v. Hall, 26 F. Cas. 79 (C.C.S.D. Ala. 1871) (No. 15,282). 
189 Id. at 79. 
190 Id. at 79–80. 
191 CURTIS, NO STATE SHALL ABRIDGE, supra note 2, at 258 n.8. 
192 Hall, 26 F. Cas. at 80. 
193 Id. at 80–81. 
194 Id. at 81. 
195  Id. 
196 Id. 
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power to protect these rights against unfriendly or insufficient state 
legislation.  This was so because the Fourteenth Amendment 
not only prohibits the making or enforcing of laws which shall abridge 
the privileges of the citizen, but prohibits the states from deny-
ing . . . equal protection of the laws.  Denying includes inaction as well as 
action, and . . . includes the omission to protect . . . .  [T]o guard against 
the invasion of the citizen’s fundamental rights, and to insure their ade-
quate protection, as well against state legislation as state inaction, or in-
competency, the amendment gives congress the power to enforce its pro-
visions by appropriate legislation.197 
It would be unseemly to interfere directly with state enactments and it 
could not compel activity of state official.  So the 
only appropriate legislation it can make is that which will operate di-
rectly on offenders and offenses, and protect the rights which the 
amendment secures.  The extent to which congress shall exercise this 
power must depend on its discretion in view of the circumstances of 
each case.  If the exercise of it in any case should seem to interfere with 
the domestic affairs of a state, it must be remembered that it is for the 
purpose of protecting federal rights, and these must be protected even 
though it interfere with state laws or the administration of state laws.  
We think, therefore, that the right of freedom of speech, and the other 
rights enumerated in the first eight articles of amendment to the consti-
tution of the United States, are the privileges and immunities of citizens 
of the United States, that they are secured by the constitution, that con-
gress has the power to protect them by appropriate legislation.198 
The decision combined the individual rights protected by the Privi-
leges or Immunities Clause with the right to equal protection.  The 
result was direct federal power to protect the rights against private vi-
olence aimed at punishing people for exercising them and aimed at 
preventing citizens from exercising them. 
The Supreme Court decided the Slaughter-House Cases199 a couple 
of years later.  In that decision it distinguished (appropriately) be-
tween privileges and immunities under state law and privileges and 
immunities of citizens of the United States.  But the Court suggested 
that almost all civil liberties and civil rights were privileges or immu-
nities under state law.  Federal privileges or immunities included visit-
ing the seaports, the capital, and sub-treasuries, protection on the 
high seas and in foreign lands, etc.200 
 
197 Id. 
198 Id. at 81–82. 
199 83 U.S. (16 Wall) 36 (1873). 
200 Id. at 79–80. 
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In 1874 in United States v. Cruikshank,201 Justice Bradley returned, as 
a Circuit Justice, to congressional power to reach private violence.  
The case involved a bloody massacre of black Republicans in connec-
tion with a disputed election in Louisiana.  The indictment was 
brought under the sixth section of the 1870 Enforcement Act and al-
so under certain sections seeking to protect the right to vote. 
The defendants were convicted under counts that alleged they 
banded together to injure, oppress, threaten, and intimidate two citi-
zens of the United States of African descent with intent to deprive 
them of their lawful privilege of peaceable assembly, to deprive them 
of their lives without due process of law, to deprive them of their 
right to bear arms for lawful purposes, and to intimidate them from 
voting.202 
In Hall, the circuit court (with Bradley as a ghost writer) upheld a 
congressional statute that protected rights secured by the Constitu-
tion.  By the time of Cruikshank, Bradley limited congressional power 
to the protection of rights “guarantied” or granted by the Constitu-
tion.203  Bradley distinguished Prigg v. Pennsylvania204 as a case where 
the Constitution had guaranteed the right to get the fugitive slave 
back.  He quoted Prigg rule that a right requires a remedy.  Bradley 
explained that Congress could enforce by appropriate legislation 
every right and privilege “guarantied by the constitution.”205 But with 
reference to those rights and privileges of the citizen that were mere-
ly secured against state or federal denial, Congress could not ordinar-
ily reach private actors.206  In the 1870 Act, Congress, with many fram-
ers of the Fourteenth Amendment present, had a different view.  It 
protected rights granted or secured by the Constitution and laws of the 
United States.207 
According to Bradley, the Thirteenth Amendment was different.  
It granted a right not to be enslaved.  So Congress could punish pri-
vate persons who conspired to deprive former slaves of the rights and 
privileges conferred by the Thirteenth Amendment.  As Bradley ex-
 
201 25 F. Cas. 707 (C.C.D. La. 1874) (No. 14,897). 
202 Id. at 708. 
203 Id. at 709. 
204 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842). 
205 Cruikshank, 25 F. Cas. at 709. 
206 Id. at 710. 
207 Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140, 141 (“That if two or more persons shall band or 
conspire together . . . with intent to . . . injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any citizen 
with intent to prevent or hinder his free exercise and enjoyment of any right or privilege 
granted or secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or because of his 
having exercised the same . . . .”) (emphasis added). 
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plained it, the Thirteenth Amendment granted blacks the equal en-
joyment of the laws, and a crime against them motivated by the spe-
cific intent to deny them that equality because of race (for example 
in owning a farm) would be within the scope of Congress’s power.208 
As to the Fifteenth Amendment, not withstanding its negative lan-
guage, Bradley concluded it provided a new right to Americans of Af-
rican descent—not to be denied the right to vote based on race.  This 
right could be, in his opinion, enforced not only against unfriendly 
state laws but also against individual violence designed to interfere 
with the right.209  But enforcement was limited to action on account of 
race, color, or previous condition of servitude.  This sounds helpful.  
But Bradley explained that under the Fifteenth Amendment, Con-
gress 
can regulate . . . nothing else.  No interference with a person’s right to 
vote, unless made on account of his race . . . is subject to congressional 
animadversion.  There may be a conspiracy to prevent persons from vot-
ing having no reference to this discrimination.  It may include whites as well 
as blacks, or may be confined altogether to the latter.  It may have reference to the 
particular politics of the parties.  All such conspiracies are amenable to the state 
laws alone.210 
As Bradley must have known, there was a vast conspiracy designed 
to deprive people of the right to vote for political reasons.  That is what 
the Klan was up to.  One lower court decision following the Bradley 
approach suggested that race had to be the only reason for the vio-
lence.211 
 
208 Cruikshank, 25 F. Cas. at 711, 712. 
209 Id. at 713. 
210 Id. (emphasis added). 
211 Charge to Grand Jury–Civil Rights Act, 30 F. Cas. 1005, 1007 (C.C.W.D. Tenn. 1875) (No. 
18,260).  The opinion despaired the lack of power in the federal government to protect 
citizens against, for example, politically motivated murders, such as that of a wealthy 
young man, killed because he had asked the governor to protect “negroes of his county 
who were being driven from their homes, their houses burned, and themselves mur-
dered.”  Id.  The judge suggested that the Bradley approach still held out the hope of 
protecting Americans of African descent from “violence upon the negro, simply because he 
is such, finding its sole animus in his race and color” and that such violence “may be made pe-
nal by congressional enactment.”  Id. (emphasis added).  The judge suggested that the 
Supreme Court might still (as he hoped) find in the Thirteenth Amendment or the first 
clause of the Fourteenth the power to punish private persons where “life, liberty, and 
property are violently taken, solely on account of the race and color” of the victim.  Id.  
This was, of course, important and worthwhile, but of no help to white and black Repub-
licans targeted because of their political opinions and activities—which is exactly what the 
Klan and similar groups were up to.  Reading a requirement of racial animus for private 
violence into Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment substantially undermined its po-
tential against private violence.  Similar problems existed under the Fifteenth Amend-
ment.  See United States v. Miller, 107 F. 913, 916 (D. Ind. 1901) (“It cannot be success-
fully contended that the amendment confers authority to impose penalties for every 
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By the revised Bradley view, a conspiracy to prevent lawful assem-
bly could not be punished by congressional legislation.  According to 
Bradley’s new view, to read the Fourteenth Amendment as allowing 
Congress to punish individuals for “disturbing” (what a curious word 
in light of the facts) assemblies would be “a strange inference.  That is 
the prerogative of the states.”212  He granted that the Fourteenth 
Amendment prohibited states from abridging the privilege (his 
word) of the right to assemble, but it still gave Congress no power to 
legislate against private attacks on assemblies.213  The same was true of 
the right to bear arms.214  For Bradley, the distinction between 
granted and secured rights was crucial. 
As to the due process count Bradley noted the lack of any allega-
tion that the state had by its laws interfered with the right or that it 
did not afford to all equal protection of the laws.  So that count of the 
indictment was also defective.  As to the count of conspiracy to inter-
fere with the right of certain Americans of African descent to full and 
equal benefit of laws for the security of person and property and to 
vote, the counts failed to allege the deprivations were because of race.  
Those counts were also fatally defective.215 
The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the Cruikshank decision.216  The 
Court held that the right to assemble and the right to bear arms were 
not rights granted by the Constitution.  They were merely protected 
against federal denial.  They remained subject to state jurisdiction.  
That was so except for assemblies to petition the federal govern-
ment.217  The right to assemble and other rights in the Bill of Rights 
were not intended to limit the power of the state governments.  Just 
eight years after the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, an 
Amendment designed by its leading framers to overturn the rule in 
Barron, the Court announced it was too late in the day to question 
this decision.218 
As the Court saw it, equal protection, like due process, added 
nothing to the right of one citizen against another.  The duty to se-
cure equality of rights remained with the states.  The United States 
 
conceivable wrongful deprivation of the colored man’s right to vote.  It is only when the 
wrongful deprivation is on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude that 
congress may interfere and provide for its punishment.”). 
212 Cruikshank, 25 F. Cas. at 707, 714. 
213 Id. 
214 Id. at 715. 
215 Id. 
216 United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 559 (1875). 
217 Id. at 552–53. 
218 Id. at 552. 
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was only obligated to see that states did not deny the right.219  The in-
dictment had alleged that the victims, Americans of African descent, 
had been injured and oppressed because they voted.  But the indict-
ment failed to allege the election was one for federal offices or that 
the deprivation was because of race.220 
The Cruikshank decision limited the reach of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to state action.  The enforcement statute of 1871 also 
had a clause that reached state action.  It made persons who, under 
color of law, subjected or caused to be subjected “any person within 
the jurisdiction of the United States to the deprivation of any rights, 
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution of the United 
States” liable in a civil action.221  By excising the rights in the Bill of 
Rights from the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court deprived this sec-
tion of much of its power.  Only much later—especially during the 
Second Reconstruction of the 1960s, when the Court began to rein-
state the Bill of Rights as a limit on the states under the Fourteenth 
Amendment—did this statute regain its lost power.  In the 1961 case 
of Monroe v. Pape, for example, the Court held that the victims of an 
unreasonable search and seizure had a damage action against the of-
fending police officers under what is now 42 U.S.C. § 1983.222  Since 
the Court had incorporated the protection against unreasonable 
searches and seizures as a limit on the states, this right joined the ex-
panding set of rights, privileges, and immunities of citizens of the 
United States protected by the statute. 
In the 1883 case of United States v. Harris,223 the Court considered a 
prosecution under the 1871 KKK Act.  In Harris the defendants had 
broken into a jail and beaten and otherwise abused a prisoner await-
ing trial.  They were charged with violating a section of the 1871 Act 
that punished two or more persons who conspire for the purpose of 
depriving a person or class of persons of equal protection of the laws 
or equal privileges or immunities under the laws or the due and 
equal protection of the laws.  The indictment charged the defendant 
with denying the victim the due and equal protection of the laws.224 
The Harris Court declared the statute unconstitutional.  The 
Court held the Fourteenth Amendment was merely a “guaranty of 
 
219 Id. at 554–55. 
220 Id. at 555–56. 
221 Act of Apr. 20, 1871, ch. 22, sec. 1, 17 Stat. 13 (1871). 
222 365 U.S. 167, 171 (1961). 
223 106 U.S. 629 (1883). 
224 Id. at 629–33. 
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protection against the acts of the State government itself.”225  The 
lynch mob was not the state.  The state had violated no provision of 
the Fourteenth Amendment.  The Court found the statute defective 
because it applied no matter how well the state had performed its du-
ties.  Since the act was directed against private persons without refer-
ence to the laws of the state or their administration, it was unconstitu-
tional.226  Decisions such as Harris, and the state action syllogism it 
embodied, hobbled efforts to pass federal anti-lynching legislation. 
There are very few bright spots in these years when congressional 
power was often being contracted.  In 1884, in Ex parte Yarbrough,227 
the Court upheld Yarbrough’s conviction for intimidating a citizen of 
African descent in the exercise of this right to vote in a federal elec-
tion for members of Congress.  He had been beaten and otherwise 
mistreated.228 
The Court found Congress had power to punish private persons 
for such crimes under its power to regulate the times, places, and 
manner of elections.  It also invoked structural concerns: 
That a government whose essential character is republican, whose execu-
tive head and legislative body are both elective, whose most numerous 
and powerful branch of the legislature is elected by the people directly, 
has no power by appropriate laws to secure this election from the influ-
ence of violence, of corruption, and of fraud, is a proposition so startling 
as to arrest attention and demand the gravest consideration.229 
The Court found the government had such power and need not rely 
on the states.  It also said the Fifteenth Amendment substantially con-
ferred “on the negro the right to vote, and Congress has the power to 
protect and enforce that right.”  The Court insisted that 
[t]he principle . . . that the protection of the exercise of [the right to 
vote] is within the power of Congress, is as necessary to the right of other 
citizens to vote as to the colored citizen, and the right to vote in general 
as to the right to be protected against discrimination.230 
The decisions of the Waite and Miller Courts were often bad, but 
far worse was to follow.  Congressional power to enforce the Fifteenth 
Amendment was limited to state action.231  But the Court made even 
 
225 Id. at 638 (quoting Cruikshank v. United States, 25 F. Cas. 707 (C.C.D. La. 1874) (No. 
14,897)). 
226 Id. at 639. 
227 110 U.S. 651 (1884). 
228 Id. at 656–57. 
229 Id. at 657. 
230 Id. at 665. 
231 James v. Bowman, 190 U.S. 127, 139 (1903) (“[I]t may be noticed that this indictment 
charges no wrong done by the State of Kentucky, or by any one acting under its authority.  
The matter complained of was purely an individual act of the defendant.  Nor is it 
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that barrier ineffective.  Soon clever state actions admittedly designed 
to deny blacks the right to vote were accepted by the Court.232  In ef-
fect, step by step, through a series of decisions, the Court ratified the 
ability of a political minority to replace majority rule by force, fraud, 
and later laws designed to disenfranchise American citizens of Afri-
can descent.  Of course, the destruction of democratic government 
was not completed by the end of Reconstruction.  Many Americans of 
African descent continued to vote in the South for almost thirty years 
and some white-black political coalitions still existed.233  More years of 
violence and fraud and more decisions from a compliant Supreme 
Court would be required to complete the work the state action syllo-
gism did so much to facilitate.234 
VII.  REFLECTIONS:  LEGISLATURES AS GUARDIANS OF LIBERTY 
We tend to think of the Court as the institution that protects our 
rights and the legislature as a threat to them.  But throughout our 
history some of the great advances in liberty and equality have come 
from the legislature—42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Equal Pay Act, the Voting Rights Act, 
not to mention the Bill of Rights, the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and 
 
charged that the bribery was on account of race, color or previous condition of servi-
tude.”). 
232 See, e.g., Giles v. Teasley, 193 U.S. 146, 161–62 (1904) (describing state constitutional pro-
visions that imposed requirements for voting designed to disfranchise Americans of Afri-
can descent, including proof of literacy and property ownership); Williams v. Mississippi, 
170 U.S. 213, 221–22 (1898) (describing “neutral” state constitutional provisions that the 
state court admitted were designed to remove black voters, including the poll tax). 
233 See, e.g., MICHAEL PERMAN, THE STRUGGLE FOR MASTERY:  DISFRANCHISEMENT IN THE 
SOUTH 1888–1908 (2000); KEYSSAR, supra note 84 (discussing the combination of terror-
ism and laws to suppress black, Republican, and Populist voters); DEMOCRACY BETRAYED:  
THE WILMINGTON RACE RIOT OF 1898 AND ITS LEGACY (David S. Cecelski and Timothy B. 
Tyson eds., 1998) (describing the race riot and political coup that displaced the democ-
ratically elected government of Wilmington, North Carolina). 
234 For some other discussions of state action, see, for example., Wilson R. Huhn, The State 
Action Doctrine and the Principle of Democratic Choice, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1379, 1404 (2006) 
(suggesting that the scope of the state action doctrine needs to be limited by democratic 
principles); see also Michael Les Benedict, Preserving Federalism:  Reconstruction and the 
Waite Court, 1978 SUP. CT. REV. 39 (1978) (articulating an account more sympathetic to 
the role of the Waite Court).  For another approach far less critical of the Waite Court’s 
state action cases, see generally Pamela Brandwein, A Judicial Abandonment of Blacks? Re-
thinking the “State Action” Cases of the Waite Court, 41 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 343 (2007).  One 
theory to justify federal power recognizes that the Equal Protection Clause requires pro-
tection and failure (for whatever reason) to protect basic constitutional rights is state ac-
tion.  See generally Laurent B. Frantz, Congressional Power to Enforce the Fourteenth Amendment 
Against Private Acts, 73 YALE. L.J. 1353 (1964). 
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Fifteenth Amendments—which of course were initiated by the Con-
gress. 
As Reconstruction and its aftermath show, the Court has hardly 
been a consistent champion of liberty.  The Court excised the Bill of 
Rights from the Fourteenth Amendment, and the decision stood for 
many years.  It hobbled statutes designed to reach Klan violence.  It 
struck down the ban on discrimination in inns, theaters, and railroad 
cars in the Civil Rights Cases.235  The same structural considerations 
that led the Court to protect the right to vote in federal elections 
should have led it to uphold statutes aimed at punishing Klan terror 
designed to punish people for constitutionally protected conduct. 
While the Warren Court did much for liberty and equality, one of 
the chief things it did was to uphold congressional power in the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 (under the Commerce Clause)236 and the Voting 
Rights Act of 1965.237  In 1966, in United States v. Guest, during another 
episode of Klan terror, a majority of the Justices (in concurring opin-
ions) rethought the power of Congress to punish private conspiracies 
undertaken with the intent of punishing people for the exercise of 
constitutional rights.238  The suggested expansion was short-lived, 
however. 
In the face of these developments, many thought the Court insuf-
ficiently active in protecting states’ rights.  By this view, embraced at 
the time by Barry Goldwater and Ronald Reagan, the 1964 Civil 
Rights Act and the Voting Rights Act were unconstitutional as a viola-
tion of states’ rights.239  Goldwater had two brilliant legal advisers, Wil-
 
235 109 U.S. 3 (1883). 
236 See, e.g., Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 300 (1964) (finding that there was a con-
nection between the restaurants’ discrimination against African Americans and effects on 
interstate commerce); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 258 
(1964) (upholding the constitutionality of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to disallow inns 
from discriminating against guests based on race). 
237 South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 337 (1966) (“We here hold that the portions 
of the Voting Rights Act properly before us are a valid means for carrying out the com-
mands of the Fifteenth Amendment.”). 
238 383 U.S 745, 762 (1966) (Clark, J., joined by Justices Black and Fortas, concurring and 
opining that Congress could—under section 5—reach private conspiracies to interfere 
with Fourteenth Amendment rights); id. at 774–75 (Brennan, J., joined by Chief Justice 
Warren and Justice Douglas, saying Congress could under section 5 reach private action).  
The majority opinion was based on the right to travel which does not require state ac-
tion.  Id. at 760 (“But if the predominate purpose of the conspiracy is to impede or pre-
vent the exercise of the right of interstate travel, or to oppress a person because of his ex-
ercise of that right, then, whether or not motivated by racial discrimination, the 
conspiracy becomes a proper object of the federal law . . . .”). 
239 TAYLOR BRANCH, PILLAR OF FIRE:  AMERICA IN THE KING YEARS 1963–1965, at 357, 523 (ac-
counting Goldwater opposition to the Civil Rights Act of 1964); Joseph Loftus, Goldwater 
Hits Vote Rights Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 1965, at 24; LOU CANNON, PRESIDENT REAGAN:  THE 
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liam Rehnquist and Robert Bork.  Political changes that began in 
1964 eventually brought Rehnquist and others to the Court and pro-
duced a Court more concerned with states’ rights and less inclined to 
defer to congressional judgment.  The trend crosses doctrinal catego-
ries, in cases such as United States v. Morrison240 and Alden v. Maine.241 
The Court has recently reaffirmed limitations on congressional 
power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment against private per-
sons.  In the Violence Against Women Act (really a gender violence 
act) Congress sought to punish private persons who committed a 
crime of violence based on gender—committed the crime, that is, 
because of the person’s gender.  In passing the act, Congress had task 
force reports before it documenting constitutional violations (by state 
neglect) in at least twenty-one states. 
In United States v. Morrison, the Court found the part of the statute 
that reached private persons unconstitutional based on United States v. 
Harris and the Civil Rights Cases.242  To the claim that state action was 
present in the documented failure to protect, the Court said even if 
that were a basis for congressional power, the Congress had passed a 
nationwide statute with no proof of a nationwide problem.  The stat-
ute was not congruent and proportional to the problem.243  Congress 
had reached a very different conclusion on these issues in its Recon-
struction enforcement acts.  The Rehnquist Court rejected the con-
clusion of a majority of the justices in Guest and returned to the state 
action syllogism of Harris, Cruikshank, and the Civil Rights Cases. 
Of course, history carries us only so far.  The congressmen who 
passed the Fourteenth Amendment embraced a principle against ir-
rational discrimination,244 but most did not see discrimination against 
married women as irrational.  Though they gave us a principle that 
 
ROLE OF A LIFETIME 458 (1991); LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN 
POLITICS 204, 233–34, 238, 391–92, 495 (2000) (highlighting Goldwater criticisms of the 
Warren Court).  
240 529 U.S. 598, 617, 627 (2000) (holding that neither the Commerce Clause nor Section 5 
of the Fourteenth Amendment authorized Congress to pass the civil remedy provision of 
the Violence Against Women Act). 
241 527 U.S. 706, 712 (1999) (holding that the “powers delegated to Congress under Article I 
of the United States Constitution do not include the power to subject nonconsenting 
States to private suits for damages in state courts”). 
242 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 621–24 (2000). 
243 Id. at 665. 
244 See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1064 (1871) (documenting an exchange be-
tween Reps. Hale and Stevens on the status of married women).  Stevens: “When a dis-
tinction is made between two married people or two femmes sole, then it is unequal legisla-
tion; but where all of the same class are dealt with in the same way then there is no 
pretense of inequality.”  Hale responded that by that logic, treating “negroes and white 
men” differently would be permissible.  Id. 
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reached caste legislation and irrational distinctions, they did not un-
derstand the principle as applicable to gender distinctions.  We can 
follow their principle or their expected application, but not both.  
We should follow the more general principle. 
This article may seem to be ancient history.  Still, the issue of pri-
vate violence aimed at constitutional rights is still pertinent.  The 
1871 anti-KKK Act has survived in part in 42 U.S.C. § 1985 which pro-
vides a civil action for conspiracy to deprive a person of equal protec-
tion of the laws or equal privileges or immunities under the law.  The 
Court has read the statute narrowly, however.  In 1993 in Bray v. Alex-
andria Women’s Health Clinic, for example, the Court held 42 U.S.C. § 
1985 inapplicable to a private conspiracy to block access to abortion 
clinics.245 
CONCLUSION 
Federalism is an important and valid interest.  But far too often 
the Court and others have assumed a grave threat to the role of the 
states in cases where it was not there and was never designed to be 
there—sounding the alarm if the Bill of Rights were to limit the 
states, if Congress had the power to strike at Klan violence designed 
to punish people for the exercise of constitutional rights, and if Con-
gress could punish private violence motivated by gender.  Reaching 
“private” Klan violence or gender violence need not impair the role 
of the states.  States would remain free to punish the crimes against 
state law.  Preemption does not seem a threat here, but if it were the 
Court could insist on the concurrent power of the states to punish as-
saults and murders in their jurisdictions. 
Curiously, while the Court has vigorously limited congressional 
power to protect constitutional rights against private persons in the 
interest of federalism, it has been equally active in preempting state 
laws in traditional state areas—where the justification for preemption 
is far from clear under the applicable statutes.  The result is to totally 
disable state power to protect its citizens in the areas preempted.  So 
the Court has protected us from a congressional power that seems to 
reinforce liberty and does not significantly interfere with the ability of 
 
245 560 U.S. 263, 276–77 (1993) (“The federal guarantee of interstate travel . . . . protects 
interstate travelers against two sets of burdens:  ‘the erection of actual barriers to inter-
state movement’ and ‘being treated differently’ from intrastate travelers. . . . [F]rom this 
record, the only ‘actual barriers to . . . movement’ that would have resulted from peti-
tioners’ proposed demonstrations would have been in the immediate vicinity of the abor-
tion clinics, restricting movement from on portion of . . . Virginia to another.”). 
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states to prosecute crimes arising from the same transaction, while 
preempting state common law actions and statutes designed to pro-
tect basic common law rights (for example, in tort law) when the jus-
tification for doing so is weak and state power is totally disabled.246 
How are we to explain court decisions that hobbled efforts to pun-
ish the use of terror tactics against political enemies—tactics used to 
deter their exercise of their constitutional rights and undermine de-
mocratic government?  It is a difficult question to answer.  Writing af-
ter he lost the case of Plessy v. Ferguson,247 Plessy’s counsel, Albion 
Tourgee, suggested that the Court had always been a consistent en-
emy of equal justice and equal rights.248  Certainly it has often fallen 
short. 
The Court is made up of human beings who are affected by the 
tenor of the times.  When the Court was narrowing and striking down 
anti-Klan legislation, many in the nation were reacting against both 
Reconstruction and democracy.  As Alexander Keyssar has noted, “By 
the middle of the 1870s, a scant few years after passage of the Fif-
teenth Amendment, leading intellectuals and politicians voiced deep 
reservations about universal or manhood suffrage.”249  Many of these 
had been abolitionists and had supported the Fifteenth Amendment.  
Now they opposed universal suffrage in sweeping and systematic 
terms.250  In 1874 Democrats recaptured the House of Representa-
tives, flipping a 199-88 Republican majority into a 169-109 Democ-
ratic one.251  In 1875, in Boston’s Faneuil Hall, Wendell Phillips was 
shouted down when he called for federal protection for black rights 
in Louisiana.252  By 1875–1876, according to historian David Blight, 
“[t]he will for federal intervention to stop violence and intimidation 
by ‘white liners’ against white Republicans and blacks had all but van-
ished.”253  In 1877, the Nation magazine complacently announced that 
the “negro will disappear from the field of national politics.  Hence-
forth, the nation as a nation, will have nothing more to do with 
him.”254  The story of the supposed horrors Reconstruction inflicted 
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on the South and the abandonment of white and black Republicans 
by the nation served a purpose, according to David Blight.  That pur-
pose was to facilitate reunion, a reunion on terms desired by the el-
ites who controlled the South.255 
At the same time that many former supporters were repudiating 
Reconstruction and the nation was retreating from it, the Court facili-
tated the retreat.  The Court also suggested that national protection 
of citizens’ rights would be the end of federalism. 
In the turbulent civil rights struggles of the 1960s, the nation re-
newed its commitment to democracy and equal rights, with the Con-
gress, the Executive, and the Court all moving in the same direction.  
In those years, faced again with political terror tactics, the Court 
moved away—for a short time as it turned out—from the state action 
syllogism. 
By hobbling Reconstruction statutes designed to protect citizens 
against political terrorism, the Court has provided examples of mis-
takes we should avoid.  If the Court were more fully aware of its role 
after the Civil War in undermining democracy, majority rule, liberty, 
and equality for citizens in the South, it might be more circumspect 
in praising or following decisions like Cruikshank and Harris. 
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